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ABSTRACT
We construct a new index of media slant that measures whether a news outlet.s language is more similar
to that of a congressional Republican or Democrat. We apply the measure to study the market forces
that determine political con- tent in the news. We estimate a model of newspaper demand that incorporates
slant explicitly, estimate the slant that would be chosen if newspapers independently maximized their
own profits, and compare these ideal points with .rms. actual choices. Our analysis confirms an economically
significant demand for news slanted toward one's own political ideology. Firms respond strongly to
consumer preferences, which account for roughly 20 percent of the variation in measured slant in our
sample. By contrast, the identity of a newspaper's owner explains far less of the variation in slant.
We also present evidence on the role of pressure from incumbent politicians, tastes of reporters, and
newspaper competition in determining slant.
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Government regulation of news media ownership in the United States is built on
two propositions. The ￿rst is that news content has a powerful impact on politics,
with ideologically diverse content producing socially desirable outcomes. According
to the U.S. Supreme Court, ￿One of the most vital of all general interests [is] the
dissemination of news from as many di⁄erent sources, and with as many di⁄erent
facets and colors as is possible. That interest...presupposes that right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
authoritative selection￿(U.S. Supreme Court 1945).1
The second proposition is that unregulated markets will tend to produce too little
ideological diversity. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), for example,
￿has traditionally assumed that there is a positive correlation between viewpoints ex-
pressed and ownership of an outlet. The Commission has sought, therefore, to di⁄use
ownership of media outlets among multiple ￿rms in order to diversify the viewpoints
available to the public￿(FCC 2003).2 This belief has justi￿ed signi￿cant controls
on cross-market consolidation in broadcast media ownership, on foreign ownership
of media, and on cross-media ownership within markets, and has motivated a siz-
able academic literature arguing that current media ownership is too concentrated
(Bagdikian 2000).
That news content can have signi￿cant e⁄ects on political attitudes and out-
comes has been documented empirically by Str￿mberg (2004), Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2004), Gentzkow (2006), DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan
(2006), and others. In contrast, evidence on the way market forces interact to produce
ideological content, and on the role of ownership in particular, is severely limited. Ex-
isting studies have generally relied on hand collection and coding of news content,
and so have been limited to analysis of a few outlets (e.g., Glasser, Allen, and Blanks
1The Federal Communications Commission (2003) echoes the same point: ￿Viewpoint diversity
refers to the availability of media content re￿ ecting a variety of perspectives. A diverse and robust
marketplace of ideas is the foundation of our democracy. Consequently, ￿ it has long been a basic
tenet of national communications policy that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.￿ ￿
2The report of the Hutchins Commission (Commission on Freedom of the Press 1947), arguably
the most in￿ uential study of public policy and the press, identi￿es the ￿￿rst and foremost￿obstacle
to the emergence of truth in the press as ￿the drift toward concentration of power...exempli￿ed by
the large number of cities with only one newspaper, the common ownership of newspapers and radio
stations, and the growth of newspaper chains.￿
21989; Pritchard 2002). Groseclose and Milyo (2005) make an important contribution,
proposing a new measure of ideological content based on counts of think-tank cita-
tions. However, their index has been calculated only for a small number of outlets,
and has not been used to analyze the determinants of slant.
In this paper, we propose a new index of ideological slant in news coverage, and
compute it for a large sample of U.S. daily newspapers. We then apply the measure to
study the way market forces determine slant in equilibrium. We estimate a model of
newspaper demand that incorporates slant explicitly, estimate the slant that would
be chosen if newspapers independently maximized their own pro￿ts, and compare
these ideal points with ￿rms￿actual choices. Finally, we use the model to evaluate
the contributions of consumer and owner heterogeneity to ideological diversity, and
to test other theories of what drives media slant.
Our slant index measures the frequency with which newspapers use language that
would tend to sway readers to the right or to the left on political issues.3 We focus
on newspapers￿news (rather than opinion) content, because of its centrality to public
policy debates and its importance as a source of information to consumers.4 To
measure news slant, we examine the set of all phrases used by members of Congress in
the 2005 Congressional Record, and identify those that are used much more frequently
by one party than by another. We then index newspapers by the extent to which
the use of politically charged phrases in their news coverage resembles the use of the
same phrases in the speech of a congressional Democrat or Republican. Underlying
this approach is a revealed preference assumption: namely, that the language chosen
by speakers with a political agenda will tend to persuade listeners to support that
agenda. Note that our measure has no inherent normative content￿ in our framework,
one paper￿ s slant can fall to the left or right of another￿ s, but the notion that a paper
has ￿less slant￿or is ￿less biased￿has no meaning.
Two key pieces of evidence suggest that our methodology produces a meaningful
measure of slant. First, many of the phrases that our automated procedure identi-
3The term ￿slant￿was apparently introduced by Hayakawa (1942). He uses it to refer to the
process of creating an impression through selective omission or inclusion of facts. We use the term
more inclusively to include any di⁄erences in news content that, ceteris paribus, would tend to
increase a reader￿ s support for one side of the political spectrum or the other.
4Nearly two-thirds of Americans report getting news several times a week or daily from local
newspapers (Harris Interactive 2006). Independent evidence suggests that almost 90 percent of
readers of daily newspapers read the main news section, with over 80 percent reading the local news
section (Newspaper Association of America 2006).
3￿es are known from other sources to be chosen strategically by politicians for their
persuasive impact. Examples include ￿death tax,￿￿tax relief,￿￿personal account,￿
and ￿war on terror￿(which we identify as strongly Republican), and ￿estate tax,￿
￿tax break,￿￿private account,￿and ￿war in Iraq,￿(which we identify as strongly
Democratic). Second, the index that we construct using counts of these phrases in
news coverage is consistent with readers￿subjective evaluation of newspapers￿political
leanings (data on which is available for several large papers in our sample).
We use our measure to estimate a Hotelling model of newspaper demand, in which
a consumer￿ s utility from reading a newspaper depends on the match between the
newspaper￿ s slant and the consumer￿ s own ideology (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005;
Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). Using zipcode-level data on newspaper circulation, we
show that right-wing newspapers circulate relatively more in zipcodes with a higher
proportion of Republicans, even within a narrowly de￿ned geographic market. This
fact is robust to correcting for measurement error and endogeneity in newspaper slant
using an identi￿cation strategy in the spirit of George and Waldfogel (2003). Our
model implies that consumer demand for slant is not only statistically, but also eco-
nomically signi￿cant: a one-standard-deviation move away from the pro￿t-maximizing
level of slant would lead to a loss in circulation of approximately 3 percent. Our model
also allows us to predict the slant that each newspaper would choose if it indepen-
dently maximized its own pro￿ts, as a function of the share of Republicans in its
market.
We next turn to the supply-side of the market, comparing our estimates of pro￿t-
maximizing slant to the actual slant chosen by newspapers. Our ￿rst ￿nding is that
newspapers￿actual slant is neither to the right nor to the left of the pro￿t-maximizing
level on average. Although we replicate Groseclose and Milyo￿ s (2005) ￿nding that
the average newspaper￿ s language is similar to that of a left-of-center member of
Congress, we estimate that the pro￿t-maximizing points are also left-of-center on
average. These ￿ndings are relevant to theories in which supply-side forces cause
distortions in slant at the aggregate level. For example, if either the party identity of
national incumbent politicians (Besley and Prat 2006) or the distribution of political
views among journalists in the country as a whole (Baron 2006) were important
drivers of slant, we would have expected to see deviation from pro￿t maximization
on average.
4Our second ￿nding is that the variation in slant across newspapers is strongly
related to the political makeup of their potential readers, and thus to our estimated
pro￿t-maximizing points. The relationship between slant and consumer characteris-
tics remains when we compare di⁄erent newspapers with the same owner, or di⁄erent
newspapers located in the same state, and survives controlling for measures of news-
paper quality. Changes over time in consumer politics are a highly signi￿cant predic-
tor of changes in newspaper slant. Overall, variation in consumer political attitudes
explains roughly 20 percent of the variation in measured slant in our sample.
An obvious concern in interpreting the relationship between slant and consumer
attitudes is that it may re￿ ect causation running from slant to consumer beliefs rather
than the reverse. To address this, we show that the relationship survives when we
instrument for consumer political attitudes using characteristics such as religiosity and
race that are strong predictors of political preferences but are unlikely to be a⁄ected
by newspaper content. These results do not mean that newspapers do not a⁄ect
beliefs￿ indeed, our study is motivated in part by evidence that they do. Rather, our
￿ndings suggest that the e⁄ect of slant on ideology accounts for only a small part of
the cross-sectional variation in ideology that identi￿es our model.
Our third ￿nding is that ownership plays little or no role in determining slant.
After controlling for geographic clustering of newspaper ownership groups, the slant
of co-owned papers is only weakly (and statistically insigni￿cantly) related to a news-
paper￿ s political alignment. Estimates from a random e⁄ects model suggest that
ownership does not account for any of the variation in measured slant, with a con￿-
dence interval that rules out economically large e⁄ects. We also ￿nd no evidence that
owner e⁄ects arise when political incentives are strong (i.e., during close elections),
and no evidence of systematic changes in slant around mergers. Finally, direct proxies
for owner ideology, such as patterns of corporate or executive donations to political
parties, are unrelated to slant.
In the ￿nal section of the paper, we consider evidence on three additional forces
that may a⁄ect slant￿ pressure from incumbent politicians (Besley and Prat 2006),
the tastes of reporters and editors (Baron 2006), and competition (Mullainathan
and Shleifer 2005). As mentioned above, our ￿nding that newspapers are neither to
the right nor to the left of our estimated ideal points on average suggest that the
importance of the ￿rst two of these forces is limited at the aggregate level. We go
5on to ask whether political pressure or reporters tastes can explain the variation in
slant across papers, and we present several pieces of evidence suggesting that they
are unlikely to play a large role. We ￿nd evidence consistent with Mullainathan and
Shleifer￿ s (2005) prediction that more competitive media markets will have greater
cross-outlet variation in slant, but our test of this hypothesis has limited power.
We wish to stress two important caveats. First, our results are speci￿c to the
context we are studying￿ a developed economy with a relatively competitive press
and strong protections for press freedom. The picture will almost certainly look
di⁄erent in other settings, and understanding how the drivers of slant change with
the legal and institutional environment is an important topic of ongoing research.
Second, our measure of slant is a broad aggregate that includes coverage of many
di⁄erent topics over a reasonably long window of time. Nothing we ￿nd precludes
the possibility that owners, politicians, or reporters may exert signi￿cant in￿ uence
on coverage of speci￿c stories where their incentives are especially high.
This paper presents the ￿rst large-scale empirical evidence on the determinants
of political slant in the news.5 Hamilton (2004) presents an important overview
of many of the issues we explore. Our ￿ndings on the demand for slant, and on
newspapers￿response to consumer preferences, support theories that posit a role for
consumers￿prior beliefs in driving media positioning (e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer
2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Suen 2004). Our ￿ndings on the average slant in
the media, the role of owner ideology, and the role of political pressure and reporters￿
tastes inform models that focus on the role of the suppliers of news in determining its
content (e.g., Besley and Prat 2006; Balan, DeGraba, and Wickelgren 2005; Baron
2006).
Our work also advances the measurement of media slant (Groseclose and Mi-
lyo 2005; Puglisi 2006; Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder 2006; Gentzkow, Glaeser, and
Goldin 2006).6 Groseclose and Milyo (2005) use Congressional citations to estimate
5An existing literature explores the determinants of newspaper endorsements of political can-
didates, rather than news content (see, e.g., Akhavan-Majid, Rife, and Gopinath 1991; or An-
solabehere, Lessem, and Snyder 2006). We focus on news content because of its centrality to public
policy debates, and because it is likely to exhibit very di⁄erent variation across newspapers. Indeed,
in speci￿cations not reported in the paper, we ￿nd that a considerable portion of the variation in
slant is independent of endorsements, and that, after controlling for news slant, consumer demand
does not depend on endorsements. These ￿ndings imply that news and editorial slant are very dif-
ferent both statistically and economically, suggesting that our emphasis on news content is likely to
reveal important patterns not visible when using data on endorsements (and vice versa).
6Our approach borrows tools from the computer science literature on ￿text categorization￿(see
6the political positions of think tanks, and then use data on media mentions of the
same set of think tanks to measure the bias of 20 news outlets. Our automated pro-
cedure allows us to measure the slant of a much wider range of outlets, including
over 400 daily newspapers representing over 70 percent of total daily circulation in
the United States. Moreover, rather than imposing a list of likely partisan phrases
(such as names of think tanks), we use data from Congress to isolate the phrases that
have the most power to identify the speaker￿ s ideology. This methodology is likely
to increase precision. It is also applicable in situations in which a list of politically
slanted sources is not available, or when sources such as think tanks are rarely cited.
Finally, our ￿ndings contribute to the literature on product positioning in the mass
media (Sweeting 2006; Myers 2005; George 2001), as well as to research on product
di⁄erentiation more generally (Mazzeo 2002a and 2002b; Dranove, Gron, and Mazzeo
2003; Seim forthcoming). The existence of rich, within-market variation in consumer
ideology allows us to estimate the demand for slant without assuming that it is
chosen optimally. We can then use variation across markets to test the hypothesis
that slant is chosen to maximize pro￿ts. With a few exceptions (e.g., DubØ, Hitsch,
and Manchanda 2005; Einav forthcoming), data limitations have generally made such
comparisons di¢ cult.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our data
sources. Section 3 describes the computation of our measure of newspaper slant, and
shows evidence validating this measure against alternative rankings of newspapers￿
political content. Section 4 discusses our model and estimates of the demand for slant.
Section 5 presents theory and evidence on the supply of slant. Section 6 tests several
prominent theories about the determinants of media slant. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Congressional Record and Congressperson Data
Our approach to measuring slant requires data on the frequency with which individual
members of Congress use particular phrases. We use the text of the 2005 Congres-
Aas and Eikvil 1999 for a review), which social scientists have applied to the measurement of
sentiment (e.g., Antweiler and Frank 2004), and politicians￿platforms (Laver, Benoit, and Garry
2003), but not (to our knowledge) to the political slant of the news media.
7sional Record,7 parsed using an automated script that identi￿es the speaker of each
passage.8
To increase the e¢ ciency of our text analysis algorithm, we apply a standard pre-
processing procedure that removes extremely common words (such as ￿to,￿￿from,￿
and ￿the￿ ) and strips words down to shared linguistic roots (so that, for example,
￿tax cut￿and ￿tax cuts￿are identi￿ed as the same phrase).9 A ￿nal script produces
counts by speaker and party of two- and three-word phrases in the Congressional
Record.10
For each congressperson,11 we obtain data on party identi￿cation, as well as the
share of the 2004 two-party presidential vote total going to George W. Bush in the
congressperson￿ s constituency (congressional district for representatives; state for sen-
ators). This vote share serves as our primary measure of a congressperson￿ s ideology,
and is strongly correlated with voting behavior as measured by the congressperson￿ s
adjusted ADA score (Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999).12 We also obtain data on
the state, Census division, and demographic characteristics of each congressperson￿ s
constituency.13
7Our database of Congressional Record text is incomplete, mostly due to errors in the website
that archives the Congressional Record. These errors a⁄ect a relatively small share of documents in
the Congressional Record (roughly 15 percent).
8We use an automated script to download the Congressional Record from
<http://thomas.loc.gov/>. We wish to focus on ￿ oor speeches rather than text that is pri-
marily procedural, so we exclude speech by o¢ cers such as the Clerk, the Speaker of the House, and
the President of the Senate. We also exclude block quotations, text that is inserted into the Record
from other sources such as reports or letters, and non-speech items like records of roll-call votes.
9We used a list of extremely common words (￿stopwords￿ ) from Fox (1990). We use the ￿Porter
Stemmer￿(<http://www.tartarus.org/martin/PorterStemmer/>) to strip words down to their lin-
guistic roots. We also remove several proper nouns that appear frequently in procedural text￿ days
of the week, the ￿Hart Senate O¢ ce Building,￿and the ￿Dirksen Senate O¢ ce Building.￿Finally,
we exclude names of major newspapers.
10We exclude single words because they occur with higher frequency than phrases and so are
costly to search for in newspapers. Preliminary investigation also suggested that most single words
are used across many contexts and so generate a high noise to signal ratio. Phrases of four or more
words are costly in terms of text processing, and in a preliminary analysis did not appear to add
signi￿cantly to the precision of our measure.
11We use the word ￿congressperson￿as a generic term to refer to members of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
12The correlation coe¢ cient is ￿:75 (higher ADA scores correspond to more liberal politicians).
We thank Tim Groseclose for providing us with adjusted ADA scores covering members of Congress
through 1999. Because our analysis is based on the 2005 Congressional Record, the correlation
coe¢ cient is for the sub-sample of members who were present in 1999.
13Data on presidential vote shares and demographic characteristics of congressional districts are
from <www.polidata.org>.
82.2 Newspaper Text and Characteristics
As an input to our slant measure, we obtain counts of the frequency with which
phrases appear in news coverage from two sources: the NewsLibrary database and the
ProQuest Newsstand database.14 For each database, we use an automated script to
calculate the number of articles containing each phrase in each newspaper during cal-
endar year 2005. Whenever possible, we exclude opinion content. Also, because some
newspapers do not archive reprinted wire stories with ProQuest, we exclude articles
from the Associated Press, focusing instead on content originating with the newspa-
per. Appendix A provides additional details on the mechanics of these searches, as
well as an audit study of the extent to which we successfully exclude opinion and wire
content.
We include in our sample only English-language daily newspapers. Data are avail-
able for 394 such newspapers from NewsLibrary and 164 from ProQuest, with an
overlap of 125 newspapers. This leaves us with a total sample of 433 newspapers in
2005.15 Among the newspapers that overlap between the two databases, the correla-
tion between the counts for the sample of phrases described below is :85, indicating
high cross-database reliability.16 In cases of overlap, we use the NewsLibrary counts
for analysis.
To measure the ownership and market characteristics of the newspapers in our
sample, we ￿rst match every newspaper to data from the 2001 Editor and Publisher
(E&P) International Yearbook CD-ROM. The E&P dataset identi￿es the zipcode of
each newspaper￿ s headquarters, which we match to counties using the United States
5-Digit ZIP Code Database from Quentin Sager Consulting. We match counties
to primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs) using de￿nitions from the 1990
census. We de￿ne each newspaper￿ s geographic market as the PMSA in which it is
headquartered. If a newspaper is not located inside a PMSA, we de￿ne its market to
14See <http://www.newslibrary.com> for the NewsLibrary database and <http://proquest.com>
for the ProQuest database.
15One additional newspaper￿ the Chicago Defender￿ is present in the news databases, but is
excluded from our analysis because it is an extreme outlier (more than 13 standard deviations away
from the mean) in the distribution of slant. A large share of hits for this paper are for a single
phrase, ￿African American,￿which is strongly predictive of liberal ideology in Congress.
16Possible reasons that the databases do not agree perfectly include: (i) a lag between the publi-
cation of an article and its posting; (ii) di⁄erences in the set of articles newspapers choose to post
to each database; and (iii) di⁄erences in how the two databases permit us to identify editorials and
opinion pieces.
9be the county in which it is located.
For each newspaper, we obtain a wide range of demographic characteristics of the
paper￿ s market from the 2000 U.S. Census. We also obtain data from David Leip￿ s
Atlas of US Presidential Elections (<http://www.uselectionatlas.org>) on the share
of votes in each market going to Bush in the 2004 presidential election, as a proxy for
the market￿ s political leanings. Lastly, we use the DDB Needham Life Style Survey
(Putnam 2000), available on <www.bowlingalone.com>, to compute a measure of the
share of survey respondents from 1972-1998 who report attending church monthly or
more. This measure serves as a plausibly exogenous shifter of the political leanings of
the market in that it is unlikely to be directly a⁄ected by the slant of area newspapers.
The E&P dataset provides information on a number of newspaper characteristics,
such as the number of pages in the paper and the number of employees, which serve
as a proxy for the quality of the newspaper (Berry and Waldfogel 2003). We also
obtain data from <www.pulitzer.org> on the number of Pulitzer prizes won by each
newspaper since 1970. The E&P dataset identi￿es the owner of each newspaper as of
2000.
As a potential proxy for a media ￿rm￿ s ideological leanings, we obtain data from
the Center for Public Integrity (<http://www.publicintegrity.org>) on the share of
each newspaper ￿rm￿ s corporate political contribution dollars going to Republicans.
We also searched the Federal Election Commission (FEC) disclosure database for
information on the personal contributions of the CEO, President, Chairman, and
Managing Director of each ￿rm that owns two or more U.S. daily newspapers. For
newspapers owned by a ￿rm with no other daily newspaper holdings, we conducted
an analogous search, but collected data on executives of the newspaper itself.
2.3 Newspaper Circulation and Consumer Characteristics
For our study of the e⁄ects of slant on newspaper demand, we use zipcode-level data
on newspaper circulation from the Audit Bureau of Circulation￿ s (ABC) Newspaper
GeoCirc dataset, which covers 297 of the papers in our sample. We match each
zipcode to a news market. If a given market contains no readers of a newspaper, we
exclude observations in that market-newspaper pair from the dataset.17
17Because our analysis will use only variation across zipcodes within a market, such cases provide
no additional variation with which to identify our models.
10To adjust for non-political di⁄erences across zipcodes, we make use of a set of
zipcode demographics taken from the 2000 U.S. Census (<www.census.gov>).
Measuring each zipcode￿ s political preferences is complicated by the fact that vot-
ing data are not available at the zipcode level. To circumvent this problem, we use
the Federal Election Commission￿ s (FEC) 2000, 2002, and 2004 Individual Contribu-
tions Files. These ￿les, which are available for download at <http://www.fec.gov>,
contain a record of every individual contribution to a political party, candidate, or
political action committee registered with the FEC. Each donor record includes a
complete address, allowing us to identify donors￿zipcodes. For each zipcode, we
compute the share of donations (denominated in number of donations, not dollars)
received by a Republican a¢ liate, among donations received by either Republican- or
Democrat-a¢ liated entities.
This calculation gives us a noisy, but informative proxy for the political attitudes
of each zipcode. To test its validity, we take advantage of data on the number of
registered Democrats and Republicans by zipcode in California as of March 2006.18
A zipcode-level regression of our donation measure on the share of Republican regis-
trants, weighted by the total number of donors in the zipcode, has an R2 of 0:65. The
donation and registration variables are also highly correlated across U.S. counties.
Of course, the sample of donors to political causes is not fully representative of the
entire population of a zipcode. Donors tend to be older, richer, and more educated
than non-donors (Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski forthcoming). However, these are also
the demographic characteristics of likely readers of newspapers (Gentzkow forthcom-
ing), and therefore, if anything, may tend to make our measure more representative
of the population relevant for studying newspaper demand.
3 Measuring Slant
Our approach to measuring the slant of a newspaper will be to compare phrase
frequencies from the newspaper with phrase frequencies in the 2005 Congressional
Record, in order to identify whether the newspaper￿ s language is more similar to that
of a congressional Republican or a congressional Democrat. Following a large litera-
ture in computer science on ￿text categorization￿(Aas and Eikvil 1999), we proceed
18We are grateful to Marc Meredith for providing these data.
11in two steps. First, we select a subset of the millions of phrases in the Congressional
Record to use for our analysis. Second, we aggregate the frequencies of the resulting
phrases into a single measure of political slant.
For a concrete illustration of our approach to measuring slant, consider the use of
the phrases ￿death tax￿and ￿estate tax￿to describe the federal tax on assets of the
deceased. The phrase ￿death tax￿was coined by the tax￿ s conservative opponents.
According to a high-level Republican sta⁄er, ￿Republicans put a high level of im-
portance on the death/estate tax language￿ they had to work hard to get members
to act in unison, including training members to say ￿ death tax￿ ... Estate tax sounds
like it only hits the wealthy but ￿ death tax￿sounds like it hits everyone￿(Graetz and
Shapiro 2005). In the U.S. House of Representatives in 2005, Republicans used the
phrase ￿death tax￿365 times and the phrase ￿estate tax￿only 46 times. Democrats,
by contrast, had the reverse pattern, using the phrase ￿death tax￿only 35 times and
the phrase ￿estate tax￿195 times.
The relative use of the two phrases in newspaper text conforms well to prior ex-
pectations about political slant. Compare, for example, the Washington Times and
the Washington Post. The former is widely perceived to be a conservative newspaper,
while the latter is generally thought to be more liberal.19 In 2005, the Post used the
phrase ￿estate tax￿13:7 times as often as it used the phrase ￿death tax,￿while the
Times used ￿estate tax￿1:3 times as often. As we show below, this case is not un-
usual: there is a signi￿cant correlation between popular perceptions of a newspaper￿ s
political leanings and its propensity to use words and phrases favored by di⁄erent
political parties in Congress. Our measure of media slant exploits this fact by en-
dogenously identifying politically charged phrases like ￿death tax￿and ￿estate tax,￿
and computing their frequencies in daily newspapers throughout the United States.
3.1 Selecting Phrases for Analysis
In order to make the analysis manageable, we ￿rst need to select from the millions
of phrases that appear in congressional speech a subset of phrases that are likely to
be informative about partisanship. To do so, we measure the extent to which each
19The website <www.mondotimes.com> presents an index of newspapers￿political leanings based
on user ratings. The Times is rated as ￿conservative￿ while the Post is rated as ￿leans left.￿
Groseclose and Milyo (2005) also rate the Times as signi￿cantly to the right of the Post.
12phrase is used di⁄erentially by one party or the other. Let fpd and fpr denote the
total number of times phrase p is used by Democrats and Republicans respectively.
Let f￿pd and f￿pr denote the total count of phrases that are not phrase p spoken
by Democrats and Republicans, respectively (where we restrict attention to the set
of phrases with the same number of words as p). To identify partisan phrases, we
compute a Pearson￿ s ￿2 statistic for the null hypothesis that the propensity to use






(fpr + fpd)(fpr + f￿pr)(fpd + f￿pd)(f￿pr + f￿pd)
(1)
The ￿2 statistic is a convenient summary of the political asymmetry in the use of
a phrase, because it incorporates both how often the phrase is used by each party and
its overall importance in political speeches. (More naive statistics, such as the ratio
of uses by Republicans to uses by Democrats, would tend to select phrases that are
used only once by Republicans and never by Democrats, even though pure sampling
error could easily generate such a pattern.) It is also simple to compute, in the sense
that it requires only two calculations per phrase: the number of uses by Republicans,
and the number of uses by Democrats.
In addition to the ￿2 statistic, we also compute the total number of times that
each phrase appeared in newspaper headlines and article text in the ProQuest News-
stand database from 2000-2005. In order to be useful for our purposes, a phrase must
be in su¢ ciently common use to actually show up routinely in newspaper searches.
Procedural phrases, such as ￿yield the remainder of my time,￿which are commonly
employed in the Congressional Record but are almost never used outside of parlia-
mentary contexts, are unlikely to be helpful in identifying the slant of a newspaper.20
Additionally, phrases that are extremely common, such as ￿third quarter￿or ￿ex-
change rate￿would generate a large number of hits and so have a high computational
cost relative to the additional information they convey. We therefore restrict atten-
tion to two-word phrases that appeared in at least 200 but no more than 15;000
newspaper headlines, and three-word phrases that appeared in at least 5 but no more
than 1;000 headlines. We also drop any phrase that appeared in the full text of more
20Parliamentary protocol means that a number of procedural phrases are used more often by either
the majority or minority party, and so show up as partisan speech according to the ￿2 measure:
13than 400;000 documents.21 Our ￿nal set consists of the top 500 two-word and top
500 three-word phrases by ￿2 that satisfy this criterion, for a total of 1,000 phrases.
Table 1 shows the top phrases (by ￿2) in our ￿nal set of 1,000.22 Panel A shows
phrases used more often by congressional Democrats. Panel B shows phrases used
more often by congressional Republicans.
Our procedure identi￿es many phrases that both intuition and existing evidence
suggest are chosen strategically for their partisan impact. For example, a widely
circulated 2005 memo by Republican consultant Frank Luntz advised candidates on
the language they should use to describe President Bush￿ s proposed social security
reform:
Never say ￿ privatization/private accounts.￿Instead say ￿ personalization/personal
accounts.￿Two-thirds of America want to personalize Social Security while only
one-third would privatize it. Why? Personalizing Social Security suggests own-
ership and control over your retirement savings, while privatizing it suggests a
pro￿t motive and winners and losers (Luntz 2005).
We identify ￿personal accounts,￿￿personal retirement accounts,￿and ￿personal sav-
ings accounts￿as among the most Republican phrases in the Congressional Record,
while ￿private accounts,￿￿privatization plan,￿and four other variants show up among
the most Democratic phrases.
Similarly, the large number of phrases relating to tax policy also accord well with
expectations. We identify ￿death tax￿(whose partisan pedigree we discuss above) as
the third most Republican phrase. We identify ￿tax relief￿ ￿ a term also advocated
by Luntz (2005)￿ as strongly Republican, while ￿tax break￿and ￿tax cuts for the
wealthy￿are strongly Democratic. Other phrases highlight the traditional partisan
divide over the size of government￿ the Republican list includes four variants on ￿tax
21These cuto⁄s are arbitrary. They were chosen to exclude as e¢ ciently as possible both procedural
text (on the bottom end) and extremely common everyday phrases (on the top end). When we
tighten the cuto⁄s by excluding, for example, the top and bottom ￿ve percent of phrases ranked
by the total number of headlines mentioning the phrase, the resulting measure is highly correlated
with our own, and produces similar results statistically. (See appendix B for details.) Our ￿ndings
therefore do not seem particularly sensitive to the choice of headline count cuto⁄s for these phrases.
22Some of the two-word phrases on our list are proper subsets of three-word phrases that also ap-
pear on the list. These phrases are not necessarily redundant statistically, because our preprocessing
step (removal of stopwords and stemming) means that the two-word phrases may arise in somewhat
di⁄erent contexts than the three-word phrases. Nevertheless, we have veri￿ed that excluding these
phrases produces a slant measure highly correlated with our own.
14increase,￿ while the Democratic list includes sixteen phrases referring to spending
cuts (￿cut student loans,￿￿cut food stamps,￿￿cut medicaid,￿and so forth).
On foreign policy, we identify variants on the phrase ￿global war on terror￿as
among the most strongly Republican phrases, while ￿war in Iraq￿and ￿Iraq war￿are
Democratic. Stevenson (2005) describes the Bush administration￿ s choice to adopt
the phrase ￿global war on terror￿to describe the con￿ ict in the Middle East rather
than explicitly referring to Iraq. Democratic phrases also include ￿veterans health
care￿and ￿bring our troops home￿ ; Republican phrases include ￿Saddam Hussein,￿
￿change hearts and minds,￿and ￿Iraqi people.￿
3.2 Mapping Phrases to Ideology
The next step is to map the use of these 1,000 phrases into a continuous measure of
ideology. For computational simplicity, the ￿2 statistic we used to select the phrases
was based only on whether a speaker was a Republican or a Democrat. To increase
precision, we now wish to use a measure that will distinguish relatively liberal or
conservative members of each party. The measure we will use is the share yc of
voters in the congressperson c￿ s constituency voting for the Republican presidential
candidate in 2004.23 For each congressperson c, and phrase p, we de￿ne spc to be the
frequency with which the congressperson uses phrase p, normalized as a share of the
congressperson￿ s total number of uses of the overall set of 1;000 phrases.
We adopt a simple factor model of the relationship between language and ideology.
We assume that the share of a phrase in a congressperson￿ s speech (spc) is a linear
function of her ideology (yc):
spc = ￿p + ￿pyc + "pc, (2)
where "pc is an error term orthogonal to yc. For notational ease, we will let ~ spc =
spc ￿ ￿p be the ￿de-meaned￿frequency of phrase p for congressperson c.
We will choose an estimator for yn to minimize a least-squares loss function, which
penalizes an estimate ￿ yn according to the Euclidean distance between the expected
frequencies of each phrase and the observed (de-meaned) frequencies ~ spn for individual
23When we instead measure ideology using adjusted ADA scores based on congressional roll call
votes, the resulting slant estimate is highly correlated with our baseline measure, and produces very
similar results in the analyses of newspaper slant we report below. See appendix B for details.
15n. That is, we will choose ￿ yn to solve





~ spn ￿ ￿pyn
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This estimator is interpretable as a sum of the phrase frequencies ~ spn, scaled by
the relationship between the the ideology of a congressperson and the frequency with
which that congressperson uses the phrase.24 If the use of some phrase p is uncorrelated
with a congressperson￿ s ideology (￿p = 0), the use of that phrase does not contribute
to the estimator ￿ yn. If phrase p is used more often by more right-wing congresspeople
(￿p > 0), the estimator will judge a person who uses p often as more right-wing.
It is easy to see that E (￿ yn) = yn if the shares ~ spn are governed by model (2). Note
that the parameters ￿p are not observed by the econometrician, so that ￿ yn cannot be
computed directly. However, given counts by congressperson c for each phrase p, it
is straightforward to compute regression estimates ^ ￿p; ^ ￿p of the model￿ s parameters,
and then produce a (consistent) estimate ^ yn of yn by substituting these estimates for
the true parameters ￿p;￿p in equation (4).
The estimator ^ yn performs well in our sample of congresspeople. As we would
expect based on its construction, a regression of estimated ideology ^ yc on true ideology
yc across congresspeople produces a constant of 0 and a coe¢ cient of 1, indicating that
our estimator is a noisy but unbiased proxy for true ideology. Moreover, our estimator
has a correlation of over 0:6 with true ideology, and a similarly high correlation with
congressional roll-call voting behavior (as measured by adjusted ADA scores). These
￿ndings lend support to the expectation that our estimator will uncover genuine
variation in ideological slant among newspapers, although they also indicate that our
measure contains a nontrivial amount of noise.
24The estimator also has a precedent in the text categorization literature: it is closely related to the
￿K-nearest neighbor￿methodology, which would estimate yn by computing the average ideology yc
of the K congresspeople whose phrase frequencies are closest to person n in terms of the Euclidean
distance metric in equation (3). Our estimator takes a more parametric approach, which takes
advantage of the continuous nature of the underlying ideology variable yc.
163.3 Estimating Newspaper Slant
Our approach to measuring newspaper slant will be to treat each newspaper n as an
unknown congressperson as in the previous subsection, and to calculate the estimator
^ yn for each newspaper. This estimator answers the question, if this newspaper were a
congressperson, how Republican would that congressperson￿ s district be? To compute
^ yn, we will use newspaper-level shares spn of each of our ￿nal 1;000 phrases. Recall
that these counts are based only on a paper￿ s news content; our search procedure
excludes opinion pieces. Our search also excludes Associated Press stories.
Despite these exclusions, our 1;000 phrases are used an average of over 13;000
times in the content of papers in our sample in 2005. Even among newspapers in
the bottom quartile of daily circulation in our sample, these phrases are used an
average of over 4;000 times. The contexts in which our phrases appear include local
analogues of national issues, local impact of federal legislation, and the actions of
legislators from local districts.25
Across the newspapers in our sample, our slant measure correlates well with reader
sentiment about the political leanings of di⁄erent newspapers. For example, ￿gure
1 shows a graph of our measure of slant for large papers against ratings of polit-
ical orientation submitted by users to the media directory website Mondo Times
(<http://www.mondotimes.com>).26 The graph shows a clear association in the ex-
pected direction: papers rated as more conservative by Mondo Times users are also
more Republican-leaning according to our index. Formal statistical tests con￿rm the
visual evidence in ￿gure 1. Across the 103 papers in our sample rated by more than
one individual on the Mondo Times website, there is a correlation of 0:24 with our
slant index (p ￿ value = 0:015), and a rank correlation of 0:26 (p ￿ value = 0:007).
Note that we would not necessarily expect these correlations to be perfect, both be-
cause most papers receive only a few ratings, and because Mondo Times users are
rating the opinion as well as news content of the papers, whereas our slant measure
focuses on news content.
25Note, however, that direct quotes of local congresspeople￿ which could cause a mechanical
correlation between slant and the political leanings of local markets￿ comprise only a tiny fraction
of the phrase mentions in our sample. Among 10 randomly chosen papers (representing di⁄erent
levels of circulation), we hand-coded the frequency of uses of the top 50 phrases in direct quotes
of congresspeople. On average, such quotes account for only 0:3 percent of the phrase hits in this
sample.
26We wish to thank Eric Kallgren of Mondo Code for graciously providing these data.
17We can also compare our measure to Groseclose and Milyo￿ s (2005) bias measures
for the six newspapers that were part of their analysis.27 Like Groseclose and Milyo
(2005), we ￿nd that the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post
are similar to one another and are well to the left of the Washington Times, which both
measures identify as the most right-leaning newspaper of this group. Our measures
disagree on two points: (i) our measure places USA Today just to the left of the
New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post, whereas their measure
identi￿es it as more centrist than those papers; and (ii) we identify the Wall Street
Journal as the second most right-leaning of these newspapers, whereas Groseclose
and Milyo (2005) estimate that it is the most liberal.
4 The Demand for Slant
In this section, we study the relationship between newspaper slant and consumer
demand for newspapers. We use zipcode-level data on newspaper circulation and po-
litical ideology to show, following Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2006), that households in more Republican zipcodes are more likely to read
newspapers with a relatively right-wing slant. This evidence provides a useful check
on the economic relevance of our slant measure, and allows us to compute, for each
newspaper, the slant that would maximize its readership given the political ideology
of consumers in its geographic market. We ￿nd that this ￿ideal slant￿varies strongly
with consumers￿political beliefs, and that deviations from consumers￿preferred slant
involve a nontrivial sacri￿ce in circulation (and, hence, pro￿ts). These calculations
serve as an important input to our study of the supply of newspaper slant in section
5.
4.1 Hotelling Model
We begin with a simple Hotelling model of newspaper demand. We denote the slant
of newspaper n by yn 2 [0;1]. We assume that all households in zipcode z have an
ideal slant, which we will model as a linear function of the zipcode￿ s Republicanism
27Groseclose and Milyo (2005) report results for six newspapers, nine television broadcasts, one
radio broadcast, three national magazines, and one online news source.
18rz:
~ yz = ￿ + ￿rz (5)
As discussed in the data section above, we will measure rz by the share of campaign
contributions in the zipcode going to Republicans. The hypothesis that more conser-
vative readers have a relatively greater taste for conservative newspapers implies that
￿ ￿ 0.
We assume that any di⁄erence between a newspaper￿ s actual slant and a house-
hold￿ s ideal slant imposes a quadratic loss (or ￿transport cost￿ ) on the household.
Formally, we de￿ne the utility of household i, in zipcode z, for newspaper n to be:
Uizn = ￿￿ (yn ￿ ~ yz)
2 + "zn + ￿izn. (6)
Here "nz is a zipcode-speci￿c utility shock, ￿izn is a household-speci￿c utility shock,
and we expect ￿ ￿ 0.28 Note that we are absorbing newspaper characteristics such
as price or quality that do not interact with ~ yz into the error term "zn. These char-
acteristics will be absorbed by the market-newspaper ￿xed e⁄ects that we introduce
below.
We normalize the utility of the household￿ s outside option￿ the consumption bun-
dle that would be chosen conditional on not reading any newspaper￿ to be 0.29 This
incorporates an implicit maximization over all alternatives not written into the model,
including television news, Internet news, and so forth. We also assume that the utility
of consuming multiple newspapers is simply the sum of the newspapers￿individual
Uizn. This implies that a household reads a given newspaper n if and only if Uizn ￿ 0.
This model imposes the assumption that di⁄erent newspapers are independent in
28Note the implicit restriction that all consumers within a given zipcode evaluate newspapers
relative to the same ideal point. Though surely too strong, this assumption serves as a convenient
approximation to a model in which the average Republican in a heavily Republican zipcode is further
to the right than the average Republican in a more liberal zipcode. In appendix B, we present an
alternative model that allows for within-zipcode heterogeneity in political ideology. Estimates of
this model are consistent with our central conclusions regarding the impact of slant on newspaper
demand.
29Because, for the purposes of estimation, we will include market-newspaper ￿xed e⁄ects in the
model, we will e⁄ectively allow this outside option to vary nonparametrically by market. The
important content of this assumption is then that we do not allow the utility of the outside option
to vary across zipcodes. A correlation between the utility of the outside option and zipcode ideology
would complicate estimation of our complete structural model of demand, although it would not
compromise our more reduced-form ￿nding that slant and zipcode ideology interact positively in
determining demand.
19demand, and is thus a special case of a more general model where newspapers may
be less-than-perfect substitutes. Evidence in Gentzkow (forthcoming) suggests that
independence may be a reasonable approximation, and is likely to be closer to reality
than a standard discrete-choice framework that would require papers to be perfect
substitutes at the individual level.30
Finally, we assume that the household-speci￿c utility shock ￿izn is distributed
i.i.d. uniform across households on the interval that includes the maximum and
minimum values of ￿￿ (yn ￿ ~ yz)
2 + "zn. This implies that the share of households
reading newspaper n in zipcode z will be a linear function:
Szn = ￿ ￿ ￿ (yn ￿ ~ yz)
2 + "zn; (7)
where ￿ is a constant. (We abuse notation slightly here, in that both ￿ and the vari-
ance of the zipcode-level shock "zn are rescaled when we integrate over the household-
speci￿c shocks.) The assumption of uniform disturbances will simplify the analysis
by making the interpretation of coe¢ cients and the process of aggregation over zip-
codes transparent. It is not critical, however￿ we have estimated an alternative model
under the assumption that ￿izn is distributed i.i.d. type-II extreme value and obtain
similar results regarding the determinants of consumer demand and the implications
for ￿rms￿optimal choice of slant.
4.2 Identi￿cation and Estimation
There are two related sources of variation one could use to identify the parameters of
this model. One possibility would be to look at zipcodes with similar ideology and ask
how the circulation of newspapers varies according to their slant. For any ideology
rz, it would be straightforward in principle to identify both the ideal point ~ yz and
the extent to which circulation falls when yn di⁄ers from ~ yz. Alternatively, one could
look at newspapers with similar slant and compare circulation across zipcodes with
di⁄erent ideologies rz. Because of the symmetry of the quadratic function, either or
both of these sources of variation could allow an econometrician to recover the utility
30We have estimated a logit choice model in which each household is required to choose at most
one of the newspapers available in its market. Our ￿ndings regarding the determinants of consumer
demand, and the implications for ￿rms￿pro￿t-maximizing choice of slant, remain similar in this
alternative speci￿cation.
20parameters ￿, ￿, and ￿.
This can be seen explicitly by substituting for ~ yz in equation (7) and expanding















The regression of Szn on a constant term and the linear, squared, and interaction terms
in yn and rz has six free parameters; the model, however, has only four parameters:
￿, ￿, ￿, and ￿. One approach to estimation is to include zipcode ￿xed e⁄ects and so
use only the variation across newspapers for a given zipcode. Another is to include
newspaper ￿xed e⁄ects and so use only the variation across zipcodes for a given
newspaper.
We will take the second approach, exploiting variation across zipcodes and con-
trolling for mean di⁄erences among newspapers nonparametrically. We do this for two
reasons. First, newspapers have a number of important characteristics (news qual-
ity, reputation, layout, etc.) that are likely to a⁄ect demand Szn, could be correlated
with slant, and are di¢ cult to measure. In contrast, the most important zipcode-level
shifters, such as education and income, can easily be controlled for using Census de-
mographics. Second, the fact that a single newspaper may circulate in many di⁄erent
geographic markets introduces di¢ cult-to-measure variation in the geographic ￿￿t￿
between newspapers and individual zipcodes. Because there are many zipcodes in
each locality, we can control for this ￿t ￿ exibly by allowing di⁄erent ￿xed e⁄ects for
each newspaper in each market m (de￿ned as described above as either the zipcode￿ s
PMSA or its county).
Because we will take our identi￿cation from variation across zipcodes, we need
to control explicitly for zipcode-speci￿c shifters of demand. We include Census de-
mographics such as education and income that make some zipcodes more prone to
read newspapers than others. Moreover, we can model several dimensions of the ￿t
between a zipcode and a newspaper by including interactions between zipcode demo-
graphics and the average level of the corresponding demographics in the newspaper￿ s
market. These controls will be important if non-political dimensions of ￿t are corre-
lated with the political dimension we measure. For example, George and Waldfogel
(2003) provide evidence that black consumers are more likely to read newspapers
21when the share of blacks in the overall market is large￿ presumably because news-
papers react to this by shifting content in a way that appeals to these consumers. If
blacks tend to be liberal, and if liberal content as captured in our slant measure is
correlated with non-political content that appeals to blacks, this could cause us to
overstate the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on the interaction term ynrz. Our controls
will capture this kind of ￿t along a variety of demographic dimensions.
We wish to emphasize that our estimates will depend both on the quality of these
controls and on the accuracy of our functional form assumptions. In particular, the
quadratic speci￿cation of the utility function is what allows us to identify the key pa-
rameters while using only variation across zipcodes￿ a speci￿cation with newspaper
￿xed e⁄ects would not be identi￿ed with a more ￿ exible interaction between slant (yn)
and consumer ideal point (~ yz). Because our model is built on strong assumptions, we
will distinguish two sets of results: results supporting the basic prediction that con-
servative newspapers circulate relatively more in conservative zipcodes (which do not
depend critically on these assumptions), and estimates of the structural parameters
(which do).
We will estimate the following model:
Szn = ￿mn + 2￿￿ynrz ￿ 2￿￿￿rz ￿ ￿￿
2r
2
z + Xz￿1 + Wzn￿2 + "zn. (9)
Here, ￿mn are market-newspaper ￿xed e⁄ects, Xz is a vector of observable zipcode
characteristics, Wzn is a vector of interactions between each characteristic of zipcode
z and the level of the same characteristic in the home market of newspaper n, and ￿1
and ￿2 are vectors of parameters.
A ￿nal econometric issue is that both slant (yn) and zipcode Republicanism (rz)
are likely to be measured with error. In the case of yn, the noise comes from the fact
that our method for measuring slant is imperfect. Luckily, there is a natural instru-
ment available for yn: the overall share of Republicans in newspaper n￿ s market. If
slant is correlated with the percent of the newspaper￿ s market that is Republican (as
our supply model below will predict), using this instrument amounts to asking, in
the spirit of George and Waldfogel (2003), whether newspapers from highly Republi-
can markets have circulation that is relatively higher in Republican zipcodes within
a given market. Since slant yn enters the regression only through the interaction
ynrz, the instrument will be Rnrz, where Rn is market percent Republican. Note
22that instrumenting in this way will also correct for any endogenous e⁄ect of demand
patterns on slant yn, though such a bias is made less likely by the fact that we are
absorbing the main e⁄ect of yn in the ￿xed e⁄ects.31 Formally, the instrument will
be valid if the within-market correlation between zipcode Republicanism rz and the
error term "zn in the demand equation does not di⁄er systematically with the share
of Republicans in the newspaper￿ s market.
In the case of rz, noise is introduced because we are proxying for a zipcode￿ s politi-
cal tastes using the share of Republican campaign contributions, and the total number
of contributions is sometimes small. Although we have no natural zipcode-level in-
struments for rz, a di⁄erent strategy is available because we can model explicitly the
sampling variance in our measure of rz, as a function of the total number of con-
tributions received by either party. In particular, we can suppose that the share rz
donating to Republican candidates is distributed binomially, with the probability of
success given by r￿
z, the ￿true￿ideology of the zipcode. Under this assumption, by









where Tz is the total number of contributions in zipcode z and ￿z is a standard
normal disturbance.32 Although true ideology r￿
z is by de￿nition unknown, we can
approximate the variance of the measurement error by assuming that r￿
z is equal
to its sample average. It is then straightforward to correct the coe¢ cients using
31An endogeneity concern would normally arise in a regression of demand on a product character-
istic yn chosen optimally by a ￿rm, because market-level shocks to demand for newspapers would
a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s optimal choice of slant. However, the ￿xed e⁄ects ￿mn absorb any shocks to the
taste for newspapers at the market level. A more subtle concern is that the distribution of demand
shocks "zn across zipcodes within a market a⁄ects the marginal return to slant￿ in particular, if in a
market where Republican zipcodes randomly draw high shocks "zn the optimal choice of slant shifts
to the right. The resulting upward bias in the coe¢ cient on ynrz would then be corrected by our in-
strumental variables strategy under the same assumption stated in the text: that the within-market
correlation between rz and "zn does not di⁄er systematically with the share voting Republican in
the newspaper￿ s home market.
32Additional evidence corroborates the basic assumptions of the model in equation (10). When
we regress our donation-based measure on our registration-based measure for California zipcodes,
weighting by the number of donors, the regression constant is economically close to zero (constant
= .03, SE = 0.01) and the regression coe¢ cient is economically close to unity (coe¢ cient = 1.04,
SE = 0.02). In other words, the data suggest that it is reasonable to approximate our donation-
based measure as a noisy measure of the true Republican share. Further estimates indicate that the
variance of the error in our donation-based measure scales inversely with the number of donors, in
a manner quantitatively consistent with the predictions of equation (10).
23regression calibration (Fuller 1987).33 We would expect this adjustment to increase
the magnitude of our coe¢ cients by eliminating attenuation bias.
4.3 Results
Identi￿cation of equation (9) will be driven by the way the circulation of newspa-
pers with similar slant yn varies across zipcodes with di⁄erent ideologies rz. The
model makes two predictions about the form this variation should take. First, more
Republican newspapers should circulate relatively more in Republican areas￿ the co-
e¢ cient on the interaction ynrz should be positive. This prediction is independent
of the speci￿c functional form we have chosen and would hold in a broad class of
models. Second, there are interior ideal points￿ the share reading a paper with slant
yn will take the form of an inverted U, highest in zipcodes where rz = (yn ￿ ￿)=￿
and dropping o⁄ in zipcodes where rz is either higher or lower. This is a much ￿ner
prediction, dependent on second-order properties of the model.
Before turning to estimates of equation (9), we examine the extent to which these
predictions are con￿rmed directly in the data. A relatively nonparametric way to look
at the interaction between yn and rz is to estimate the coe¢ cient on rz separately for
each newspaper and ask how the coe¢ cients vary with yn. We have done this in a
model analogous to equation (9). Figure 2 shows the estimated coe¢ cients, plotted
against our slant measure. The ￿gure shows data for the 60 newspapers that circulate
in markets containing more than 300 zipcodes, because these are the newspapers that
provide the richest variation for identifying model (9). As predicted, the e⁄ect of
zipcode Republicanism on circulation has a clear positive relationship with slant.
A series of reduced-form regressions show that the positive interaction term ynrz is
extremely robust (results not shown). It survives controls for zipcode characteristics
(Xz) and zipcode-market interactions Wzn, as well as controls for both (i) interactions
between slant (yn) and a full vector of zipcode demographics and (ii) interactions be-
33In particular, we assume that the true ideology r￿
z of each zipcode is distributed normally, with
a mean that may depend on zipcode characteristics and a variance that we can estimate directly
given an estimate of the variance of the sampling error. We estimate the (conditional) mean of the
distribution of Republican shares by regressing shares for each zipcode on our full set of controls,
including dummies for geographic market interacted with newspaper. We then compute, for each
zipcode, the Bayesian posterior expectation of its true Republican share given our data on the share
donating to Republicans. We repeat this exercise to compute the posterior expectation of the square
of the true Republican share. We then estimate model (9) using these posterior expectations, rather
than the observed share donating to Republicans, as independent variables.
24tween zipcode republicanism (rz) and a full vector of newspaper market demographics.
The key interaction term is also positive and signi￿cant in a speci￿cation including
zipcode ￿xed e⁄ects. (In this case it is impossible to identify all of the structural para-
meters, as the terms in rz and r2
z are absorbed in the ￿xed e⁄ects. But the coe¢ cient
on the interaction term ynrz is identi￿ed, because we observe many zipcodes in which
multiple newspapers circulate.) Finally, we ￿nd that the interaction term is positive
and signi￿cant in a speci￿cation in which we instrument for ynrz with interactions
between yn and a vector of zipcode demographics, which serves to mitigate concerns
about reverse causality from newspaper slant to zipcode ideology or donations.
Figure 3 presents a di⁄erent cut of the data that allows us to examine the stronger
prediction of interior ideal points. Each panel shows the share reading newspapers in
di⁄erent deciles of the distribution of zipcode Republicanism rz, after controlling for
market-newspaper ￿xed e⁄ects ￿mn and weighted by the number of households in each
zipcode. The ￿rst panel shows this relationship for newspapers in the lowest quartile
of yn, the second panel shows the relationship for papers in the second quartile, and
so forth. Although far from perfectly clean, the graphs provide direct support for the
existence of interior ideal points that shift to the right at higher levels of yn.
Table 2 presents our estimates of equation (9). Column (1) shows the simplest
OLS speci￿cation, in which we omit the controls Xz and Wzn, do not instrument
for slant yn, and do not correct for measurement error in rz. The results con￿rm a
statistically signi￿cant interaction between zipcode politics and newspaper slant, as
suggested by ￿gure 2. As predicted by the model, both the main e⁄ect of rz and its
square enter negatively in determining demand.
The bottom rows of the table list the implied structural parameters from equation
(9), ￿, ￿, and ￿, which can be computed through simple algebraic manipulation of the
regression coe¢ cients. We have also computed Monte Carlo con￿dence intervals for
these parameters, by sampling from a multivariate normal distribution whose mean
and variance-covariance matrix is given by the asymptotic covariance matrix of the
estimated coe¢ cients. All of these parameters have the expected sign and all except
￿ are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
In column (2) of the table, we correct for measurement error in yn by instrument-
ing for the interaction ynrz using the interaction between the share of Republican
voters in newspaper n￿ s market Rn and rz. As predicted, this causes the magnitudes
25of the coe¢ cients to increase, but the qualitative pattern to remain unchanged.34 It
also increases the precision of the structural parameters, ￿ and ￿, that govern the re-
lationship between a zipcode￿ s ideology and its preferred newspaper slant. In column
(3) of the table, we correct for measurement error in rz using regression calibration
as discussed above. This causes the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients to increase, and
results in further improvements in the precision of the structural parameters ￿ and
￿.
The next two columns add controls for observable characteristics to the regres-
sion. Column (4) adds controls for zipcode demographics Xz. Column (5) includes
these controls as well as interactions between zipcode demographics and analogous
characteristics Wzn measured at the level of the newspaper￿ s markets. Neither set
of controls substantially changes the estimated importance of the match between
zipcode ideology and newspaper slant.
Our ￿nal estimates of the structural parameters in column (5) indicate that a
zipcode in which all political contributions go to Democrats prefers a newspaper
with slant 0:40, and that the ideal slant moves by a statistically signi￿cant 0:01
with every 10 percentage point change in the share contributing to Republicans in
the zipcode. The positive and statistically signi￿cant estimate of ￿ implies that
deviations from a zipcode￿ s ideal slant do indeed result in a loss of utility. To get a
sense for the magnitude of the e⁄ect, note that the standard deviation of our slant
measure is approximately 0:04, which is about two-thirds of the di⁄erence between
the Washington Post and the Washington Times. Shifting a paper from a zipcode￿ s
ideal point (where yn = ~ yn) to a level of slant one standard deviation away (where
yn ￿ ~ yn = 0:04) would reduce the fraction of households reading by about 3 percent.
This drop in demand is equivalent to a reduction of 8 percentage points in the share
of households in the zipcode with a college education. Using the own-price elasticity
of the Washington Post estimated by Gentzkow (forthcoming) as a benchmark, it is
also equivalent to the e⁄ect of an 8 percent increase in price.35
34The ￿rst stage regression underlying the 2SLS model shows a large and highly statistically
signi￿cant e⁄ect of Rnrz on ynrz, ruling out any signi￿cant weak instruments concerns (Stock
and Yogo 2002). To verify that the change in coe¢ cients between columns (1) and (2) of table 9 is
consistent with a measurement error justi￿cation for our IV strategy, we have conducted a simulation
in which we assume that the measurement error in slant among newspapers is the same (as a share
of the total variance of slant) as among congresspeople. The simulation yields expected OLS and
IV coe¢ cients very close to those we report in table 2.
35Gentzkow (forthcoming) estimates the own-price elasticity of the Washington Post to be :37.
264.4 Computing the Pro￿t-maximizing Choice of Slant
Our estimates of model (9) allow us to calculate the slant that would be chosen by
a newspaper that independently maximized its own pro￿t. In particular, assuming
a constant per-reader markup across all zipcodes,36 our demand model straightfor-
wardly implies that choice of slant that maximizes pro￿ts in the newspaper￿ s primary
market n, which we denote idealn, can be written as
idealn = ￿ + ￿￿ rn (11)
where ￿ rn is the average share donating to Republican candidates in the market as a
whole.37 Note that equation (11) is simply the expression for an individual zipcode￿ s
ideal point, with the zipcode level contribution share rz replaced by the market aver-
age ￿ rn.
Finally, recall that, at the market (rather than zipcode) level, we have data on the
Republican vote share Rn, a less noisy proxy for market ideology than the average
donation share ￿ rn.38 To take advantage of the superior accuracy of this measure, we
begin by observing that
E (idealn j Rn) = ￿ + ￿E (￿ rn j Rn): (12)
Note that an elasticity less than one makes sense in this case because the paper gets advertising
revenue from each marginal reader it gains.
36Note that this amounts to assuming that newspapers maximize circulation. In appendix B,
we show that allowing advertising revenues per reader to vary across zipcodes as a function of
demographic characteristics produces virtually identical conclusions regarding the pro￿t-maximizing
level of slant.
37We restrict attention to a newspaper￿ s primary market both for simplicity and because we do
not have detailed circulation data for newspapers not covered in the ABC data. For the subset of
newspapers for which it is possible to compute consumer ideal points using all zipcodes in which the
newspaper circulates, use of this more expansive market de￿nition produces an ideal-point measure
highly correlated with idealn. While we have computed our slant measure for a total of 433 papers, we
exclude four papers￿ the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Christian Science Monitor,
and USA Today￿ from our analysis of consumer ideal points because these national papers do not
serve a well-de￿ned local market. These exclusions do not meaningfully a⁄ect our results.
38Across markets, the share voting for Bush in 2004 and the share of donations going to Republican
candidates from 2000 to 2004 have a correlation coe¢ cient of nearly 0:8. Correlation patterns with
respect to other proxies for market ideology generally show a weak relationship with donations, once
vote shares are taken into account. These ￿ndings suggest that, while both measures are highly
related statistically, vote shares are likely to be more precisely measured. This is not surprising
given that the number of voters in a market is orders of magnitude larger than the number of
donations to political candidates.
27Modeling the conditional expectation E (￿ rn j Rn) as linear, it is then straightforward
to estimate its parameters, and, with a slight abuse of notation, to write
idealn = ~ ￿ + ~ ￿Rn (13)
where ~ ￿ and ~ ￿ are the parameters of our demand model, scaled so that they predict
idealn as a function of Rn rather than ￿ rn. We estimate that ~ ￿ = 0:41 and ~ ￿ = 0:10.
Because ￿ rn is tightly related to Rn, these estimates are very similar to the point
estimates of ￿ and ￿, respectively, from our demand model.
Note that our estimates strongly reject the null hypothesis that ~ ￿ = 0 and ~ ￿ = 1,
i.e. that idealn = Rn (p < 0:001). Our demand model thus implies that more right-
wing markets desire more right-slanted news, but does not predict that a market￿ s
preferred newspaper content will be identical to the language of its congressperson.
There are several plausible explanations for this pattern. First, the baseline fre-
quency of certain phrases in newspapers could di⁄er mechanically from their baseline
frequency in the Congressional Record, for example because the former is written
language while the latter is a transcript of spoken language. Second, the language of
congresspeople may be subject to higher-frequency political trends￿ such as the Re-
publican takeover of Congress in 1994￿ than the language of newspapers.39 Finally,
shocks to either the popularity of particular topics in the news or the relevance of
particular topics to legislation could cause random ￿ uctuations in the language of the
average newspaper and the average congressperson respectively.
5 The Supply of Slant
The previous section establishes that consumers are more likely to read a newspaper
whose slant is close to their own political ideology. This creates a strong economic
incentive for newspapers to tailor their slant to suit the political leanings of their
geographic market. In this section, we develop a model of the supply of slant that
incorporates this incentive, along with non-pecuniary motives on the part of newspa-
per owners. We then examine the way our estimated ideal points compare with the
actual slant chosen by newspapers, and test for the role of these additional incentives
39We thank Jim Snyder for pointing out this possibility.
28in determining slant.
5.1 Model
We assume that newspaper owners maximize an objective function that incorporates
both pro￿t and a direct concern for the ideological position of the newspaper. The
latter may come from a variety of sources, including a desire to change the political
views of readers (Balan, DeGraba, and Wickelgren 2005; Gentzkow, Glaeser, and
Goldin 2006), direct utility from producing content that accords with the owner￿ s own
beliefs, and indirect incentives introduced by politicians (Besley and Prat 2006).40
To capture non-pecuniary motives, we assume that each ￿rm g has an ideal slant
￿g, to which it would like its newspapers to conform. Although we will experiment
with several direct measures of ￿g, our primary approach will be to assume that owner
ideology ￿g is a normally distributed random e⁄ect with mean ￿ ￿ and variance ￿2
￿. We
assume that owners su⁄er a quadratic loss for each newspaper that deviates from
their ideal point, and that this loss is proportional to the number of households in the
newspaper￿ s market. This is a crude way to capture the intuition that a newspaper
owner would obtain more private bene￿ts from maintaining its preferred ideological
position in a major city paper than in a small-town paper.41
We assume that ￿rm g chooses slant yn for each of its newspapers to maximize










where Hn is the number of households in newspaper n￿ s market. Recall that dollar
pro￿ts ￿n are simply the product of total demand for the newspaper (governed by
the demand model we estimate in section 4) and a per-reader markup. Substituting
the demand model from equation (7), taking the derivative with respect to yn, and
40Because our model combines both pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives, it is closely related
to Becker￿ s (1957) investigation of discrimination, in which employers may care about maximizing
pro￿ts as well as about the identity of their employees. As in Becker￿ s (1957) model, ￿rms in our
framework may face a trade-o⁄between maximizing ￿nancial returns and satisfying their ideological
tastes.
41If ideological bene￿ts do not scale with the population of the geographic market, then the model
will predict more conformity to consumers￿tastes in larger markets than in smaller markets, as in
Gentzkow, Glaeser, and Goldin (2006).











where mn is the average markup of newspaper n￿ s consumers.
Equation (15) is straightforward to interpret: optimal slant is a weighted average
of the pro￿t-maximizing level of slant idealn and the owner￿ s preferred slant ￿g, where
the weights depend on the strength of the owner￿ s tastes relative to the lost pro￿ts
from deviations from consumer preferences. When the owner￿ s tastes are strong
relative to the dollar value of a marginal consumer (i.e., when ￿ is large relative
to mn), slant will be close to the owners￿preferred point ￿g. By contrast, when
consumers are valuable or the owner￿ s tastes are weak (high mn or low ￿), slant will
be close to the pro￿t-maximizing point idealn.
To implement equation (15) empirically, we suppose that our measure of slant ^ yn
is equal to y￿
n plus a noise term ￿n. Substituting for the mean of the owners￿tastes













~ ￿g + ￿n: (16)
Here, the random e⁄ect term ~ ￿g is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance
￿2
￿.
Equation (16) implies that two features of the data can identify the economic rel-
evance of owners￿tastes. First, if ownership is important the residuals of a regression
of ^ yn on Rn should be correlated within ownership groups. Second, if the weight of
tastes in the objective function ￿ is large, ^ yn will be ￿pulled￿toward owners￿tastes,
and will have a coe¢ cient less than ~ ￿ when regressed on Rn. In practice, however,
because of the uncertainty in our demand-based estimate of ~ ￿, the ￿rst approach is
far more powerful, and we therefore focus our study of owner e⁄ects on the question
of whether the residuals of slant are correlated across papers with the same owner.
We wish to emphasize that our analysis of the ￿rm￿ s positioning problem is espe-
cially simple because we treat each ￿rm as a monopolist. This allows us to analyze
a single-agent decision problem rather than a game, and to set aside incentives to
change a product￿ s position in order to soften price competition. The necessary as-
sumption is strong, and it abstracts from some important competitive interactions.
30However, we believe it is justi￿ed as a ￿rst approximation, given that only a handful
of papers in our sample face a head-to-head competitor.42
5.2 Do Newspapers Deviate from Pro￿t Maximization on
Average?
We ￿rst ask whether newspapers appear to deviate from the pro￿t-maximizing level
of slant on average. Average slant could deviate from the pro￿t-maximizing level
if it is in￿ uenced by reporters￿preferences (Baron 2006), pressure from incumbent
politicians (Besley and Prat 2006), or the average tastes of owners (Balan, DeGraba,
and Wickelgren 2005). A large popular literature has argued that such forces create
an overall liberal (Coulter 2003; Goldberg 2003) or conservative (Alterman 2003;
Franken 2003) bias in the media. Our pro￿t-maximizing model provides a well-de￿ned
benchmark against which to evaluate such claims.
We ￿nd no evidence of deviations on average from pro￿t-maximization: the average
level of slant in our sample of 429 newspapers is 0:47; noting that the average value of
Rn in our sample is 0:53, the average pro￿t-maximizing slant is ~ ￿ + ~ ￿ (0:53) = 0:46.
Figure 4 displays a histogram of the di⁄erence between actual slant and ideal point.
Although the average newspaper is slightly to the right of its consumers￿preferences,
this di⁄erence is economically small and statistically insigni￿cant.43 The evidence
does not, therefore, support the view that any of the aggregate forces mentioned
above are causing large distortions in slant.
Our results do, however, echo Groseclose and Milyo￿ s (2005) ￿nding that average
news content resembles a left-of-center congressperson, in that we ￿nd that average
slant is below the average percent Republican in our sample.44 However, we ￿nd that
42In appendix B we show that our results on the empirical determinants of slant are robust to
excluding data from the small number of cities with competing papers.
43Note that the appropriate notion of statistical signi￿cance here is one that incorporates both
sampling uncertainty in the mean level of slant, and the uncertainty in the demand parameters that
underlie our calculation of the pro￿t-maximizing level of slant. The con￿dence interval displayed in
￿gure 4 takes account of both sources of uncertainty. This con￿dence interval is fairly tight, despite
the relative imprecision of our demand estimates, because (as is common in regression models)
realizations of the intercept ￿ are negatively correlated with realizations of the slope ￿ in the
demand model.
44Indeed, 68 percent of the newspapers in our sample have a slant below the share voting Repub-
lican in their primary markets, and a paired t-test de￿nitively rejects the null hypothesis that the
distribution of slant has the same mean as the distribution of Republican vote shares (p < 0:001).
Economically, the di⁄erence between slant and Republican vote shares is large, representing about
31the average pro￿t-maximizing point is also to the left of the average congressperson.
As we note in subsection 4.4 above, our demand model implies that more right-wing
markets desire more right-slanted news, but does not predict that a market￿ s preferred
newspaper content will be identical to the language of its congressperson.
5.3 Consumer Characteristics and Slant
We turn next to the question of whether variation across markets in the preferences
of consumers can explain variation in newspaper slant. In ￿gure 5, we graph the
slant of a newspaper against the percent Republican in the newspaper￿ s market, and
plot a line showing our estimate of the ideal points idealn. Recall from section 4.4
that idealn varies across news markets as a linear function of the share Republican,
so the ideal points appear as a straight line. The graph shows clearly that in more
Republican markets, newspapers adopt a more right-wing slant, exactly as predicted
by the cross-market variation in consumer ideal points.
In table 3, we examine the robustness of the relationship between slant and con-
sumer characteristics in a regression framework. The ￿rst column presents results
from an OLS regression of slant on the Republican vote share. The positive relation-
ship observed in ￿gure 5 is highly statistically signi￿cant (p < 0:001), and variation
in consumer preferences explains nearly 20 percent of the variation in slant in this
speci￿cation.
This ￿rst column also allows us to compare the relationship between slant and
percent Republican to the one we would expect if news ￿rms were concerned only
with maximizing pro￿ts from circulation. In particular, as the ￿rst panel of the table
indicates, if newspapers were pure pro￿t-maximizers a regression of slant on percent
Republican Rn would yield a coe¢ cient equal to ~ ￿, the e⁄ect of a change in Rn on
the pro￿t-maximizing slant idealn. Our point estimates imply that slant responds,
if anything, more than expected to the tastes of a newspaper￿ s customers. However,
the actual and expected coe¢ cients are on a similar order of magnitude, and cannot
be distinguished statistically once we account for uncertainty in the demand model
parameter ~ ￿.45 Thus, we cannot reject the pure pro￿t-maximization model, although
1:5 standard deviations of our slant measure.
45Constraining the coe¢ cient on percent Republican to equal ~ ￿ produces an R2 of 14, about
three-quarters as large as the unconstrained model.
32we stress that this test has limited power due to the uncertainty in the demand model
parameters.
Columns (2) and (3) of table 3 add owner-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects and state ￿xed
e⁄ects respectively. Both the coe¢ cient and standard error change only slightly,
showing that the relationship is not driven by either owners who purchase papers in
similar markets or spurious geographic correlation in slant. Column (4) includes the
log of the newspaper￿ s number of employees, the log of the number of pages, and the
number of Pulitzer prizes from 1970-2000 as controls for newspaper quality (following
Berry and Waldfogel 2003). Although quality does appear to be negatively correlated
with our measure of slant, and the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on percent Republican
falls somewhat when these controls are added, the relationship remains strong and
highly signi￿cant.46
Results in the next two columns of table 3 address the possibility of reverse causal-
ity. Although we have been interpreting the coe¢ cients on percent Republican as
re￿ ecting an e⁄ect of consumer preferences on media slant, some of the relationship
we estimate between consumer ideal points and observed slant could result from an
e⁄ect of newspaper slant on voter beliefs and behavior (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2004;
DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan 2006). In column (5), we
instrument for ideal slant with the share of DDB Needham survey respondents in
the newspaper￿ s market reporting that they attend church monthly or more during
1972-1998. This variable has a large e⁄ect on a market￿ s political leaning (Glaeser,
Ponzetto, and Shapiro 2005) but is unlikely to be a direct result of newspaper slant in
2005.47 In column (6) we instrument for slant with a vector of other pre-determined
characteristics of the newspaper￿ s market: log population, percent black, percent with
a college degree, percent urban, and log income per capita, all of which are strong
predictors of the Republican vote share. Both IV speci￿cations show a strong and
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of Republican vote shares on slant, with coe¢ cients that
46We have also computed a language-based index that predicts the sophistication of a congressper-
son￿ s constituency (measured by the share of the constituency that is college-educated), given our
set of partisan phrases. In appendix B, we show that our main results are robust to including this
measure as a control, which supports the view that our measure captures partisanship, and not
merely the sophistication of a newspaper￿ s language.
47In a regression using data from the 421 news markets for which the church attendance variable
is available, we ￿nd that an increase of 10 percentage points in the share of respondents attending
church monthly is associated with an increase of about 0:2 percentage points in the pro￿t-maximizing
level of slant. This relationship is highly statistically signi￿cant (p < 0:001).
33are somewhat larger than in our baseline OLS speci￿cation.
In column (7) of table 3, we ask whether changes in consumer preferences are
associated with changes in newspaper slant, as measured by a preliminary version of
our slant measure for the years 2000 and 2004.48 We regress slant on percent Repub-
lican for the years 2000 and 2004, including newspaper ￿xed e⁄ects. We ￿nd that
changes in slant and changes in vote shares are strongly correlated, and the relation-
ship is both economically large (larger, in fact, than the relationship we estimate in
the cross section) and statistically signi￿cant (p < 0:001). Of course, this test may
well be confounded by reverse causality, and should be taken with caution. As a ￿rst
step towards addressing that concern, we take advantage of the widely noted fact that
college-educated voters moved (in relative terms) away from Bush between 2000 and
2004 (Teixeira, 2005), and instrument for the change in percent Republican between
2000 and 2004 with the percent college educated in 2000 (results not shown). This
instrumental variables speci￿cation also shows a strong, positive, and statistically
signi￿cant e⁄ect of changes in consumer preferences on changes in slant.
5.4 Ownership and Slant
We now turn to one of the central questions that motivated this paper￿ whether the
identity of a newspaper￿ s owner has a signi￿cant impact on slant. To address this,
we exploit the fact that many newspapers in our sample share the same owner. Of
our 429 newspapers, 346 are jointly owned with another paper in our sample. The
groups with the largest number of newspapers in our sample are Gannett (91 papers),
Media News (40 papers), and Knight Ridder (27 papers). Importantly, many groups
are heterogeneous both geographically and politically. For example, the markets
where the New York Times company owns newspapers range from New York City
(28 percent Republican), to Sarasota, FL (54 percent Republican), to Spartanburg,
SC (67 percent Republican). The within-group standard deviation of percent voting
Republican is :10, only slightly lower than the overall standard deviation of percent
voting Republican across all newspaper markets (:12). In half of the groups with
48To compute this measure, we re-apply our procedure to the Congressional Record for each
respective year, and search for the top 1,000 partisan phrases using databases of news content for
the relevant year. Because the availability of digital news content has risen over time, we have a
larger sample of newspapers available in later years. For comparability, we standardize the measure
in each year to have the same mean and standard deviation as our 2005 measure.
34multiple papers in our sample, those papers span more than one state.
Equation (15) predicts that if ownership is important we should expect to see the
slant of jointly owned papers pulled away from the pro￿t-maximizing point idealn
toward the owner￿ s own ideal point ￿g. Two jointly owned papers will then be more
similar to each other than two randomly-drawn papers. To test directly for this
pattern in the raw data, panel A of ￿gure 6 plots each newspaper￿ s slant against
the average slant of other newspapers with the same owner. The graph shows a
statistically signi￿cant positive correlation (p < :0001), providing some preliminary
evidence consistent with ownership e⁄ects.
There are at least two reasons why we would want to be cautious about drawing
conclusions from this picture, however. First, it does not adjust for variation in
consumer characteristics. If owners are more likely to own papers in markets with
similar political views, the response to consumer characteristics documented in the
last section would generate a positive correlation. Second, ownership groups are
known to be highly clustered geographically (Lacy and Simon 1997; Martin 2003),
and our slant measure is also positively correlated across papers within a state. This
latter correlation remains even after adjusting for political characteristics of markets,
in part because the kinds of political events whose coverage is picked up by our
measure often occur at the state level. Geographic clustering could thus be another
source of the positive correlation in ￿gure 6.
Panel B of ￿gure 6 shows the same relationship after adjusting for political char-
acteristics of consumers and geographic clustering. The panel plots the residual from
a regression of slant on percent Republican in a paper￿ s market and state ￿xed e⁄ects
against the average of this residual among other papers with the same owner. The
correlation seen in the previous ￿gure disappears, and the relationship between the
variables is no longer signi￿cant (p = :339).
These ￿ndings suggest that owners exert at most a small in￿ uence on newspaper
slant, once the tendency of owners to cluster in similar markets is taken into account.
For a more quantitative evaluation of the importance of both ownership and consumer
characteristics, table 4 presents estimates of the model in equation (16), including
the owner-speci￿c random e⁄ect ~ ￿g. We estimate the model by maximum likelihood,
identifying the variance of the owner-speci￿c random e⁄ect using information on the
covariance between a newspaper￿ s slant and that of co-owned papers. In other words,
35the random e⁄ects estimates translate the correlations highlighted in ￿gure 6 into a
model of the underlying sources of variance in newspaper slant.
Column (1) of table 4 examines the extent to which slant is correlated within
ownership groups before adjusting for consumer preferences. In a regression of slant
on a constant term and the random e⁄ects ~ ￿g alone, we estimate an ownership e⁄ect
with a standard deviation of about 0:015. This standard deviation is statistically
di⁄erent from zero and economically nontrivial, accounting for 13 percent of the
overall variation in measured slant. These results con￿rm the correlation visible in
panel A of ￿gure 6.
Column (2) presents estimates of equation (16), including both percent Republican
and owner-speci￿c random e⁄ects. When owner and consumer characteristics are
combined, the share of variation explained by ownership falls from 13 percent to 10
percent. This suggests that some of the ownership e⁄ect in speci￿cation (1) re￿ ects
correlation between the distribution of ownership groups and consumer characteristics
rather than a causal e⁄ect of ownership. In this speci￿cation, the share of variation
explained by consumer preferences is 0:19, consistent with our earlier ￿ndings in table
3.
In columns (3) and (4) of table 4, we add Census division and state ￿xed e⁄ects,
respectively. When we control for Census division, a relatively coarse measure of
geography, we ￿nd that ownership explains a statistically insigni￿cant 6 percent of
the within-division slant. Adding ￿xed e⁄ects for the state in which the newspaper is
located eliminates the estimated e⁄ect of ownership entirely, with con￿dence intervals
that allow us to rule out e⁄ects larger than 12 percent of the within-state variation
in slant. In contrast, the role of consumer characteristics actually grows stronger as
we focus on variation in slant within geographic areas.
To summarize, our evidence suggests that the variation in consumer characteris-
tics captured by our estimated ideal points has a robust and economically important
relationship with observed slant, consistently explaining roughly 20 percent of the
variation in the sample. In contrast, the within-group correlation of slant appears
to be largely an artifact of geographic clustering of ownership groups. After con-
trolling for the geographic clustering of owners and the political preferences of their
consumers, we ￿nd that variation in ownership explains little or none of the varia-
tion in slant. Stating the result a di⁄erent way, moving from the current level of
36cross-market heterogeneity in consumer preferences to a world in which all newspa-
pers cater to markets with identical political preferences would reduce the diversity
of slant in our preferred speci￿cation by 22 percent (with the top of the con￿dence
interval at 30 percent), whereas moving to a world with a single newspaper owner
would have a negligible e⁄ect (with the top of the con￿dence interval at 12 percent).
By assuming that the degree of measurement error among newspapers is similar
to that among congresspeople, we can adjust these variance counterfactuals for the
degree of measurement error in slant, and thus convert them to e⁄ects on ￿true￿
(as opposed to measured) slant. Among congresspeople, approximately 37 percent of
the variance in our slant measure is related to true ideology, implying that, among
congresspeople, about 63 percent of the variation in our slant index is measurement
error. Assuming this share is applicable to newspapers, we can scale up the variance
counterfactuals described above, expressing them in terms of true underlying slant
rather than measured slant. This rescaling implies that eliminating cross-market
heterogeneity in consumer preferences would eliminate fully 60 percent of the true
variation in slant.
One way to strengthen these results would be to use panel data to ask how changes
in slant and ownership are related. Unfortunately, the limited coverage of news data-
bases for earlier years limits the power of this approach. We have identi￿ed three
acquisitions during our sample period (2000-2005) for which we can measure slant
annually for at least one paper owned by both the acquired and acquiring ￿rm. First,
in 2000, the Tribune Company (owner of the Chicago Tribune) acquired the Times-
Mirror Corporation (owner of the Los Angeles Times). We have slant measures for
seven papers owned by the combined company￿ 5 initially owned by Times-Mirror
and 2 initially owned by Tribune. Second, also in 2000, Thomson Corporation sold
21 daily papers to Gannett. Our sample includes 3 of these papers and 53 papers
owned by Gannett prior to the change. Finally, in 2002, Lee Enterprises acquired all
16 dailies owned by Howard Newspapers. We have data on 1 of the Howard papers
(the Twin Falls, ID Times-News) and on 6 papers previously owned by Lee.
If ownership e⁄ects are important, we would expect the di⁄erence between the
mean slant of the acquired and acquiring papers to fall following the merger. Com-
paring the pre- and post-merger means shows that the di⁄erence did fall somewhat
for the Times-Mirror-Tribune and Howard-Lee mergers, while it increased somewhat
37for the Thomson-Gannett merger. In none of these cases is the change statistically
signi￿cant. This test has low power, due to the small number of mergers and the
small number of papers involved in each. However, the results are consistent with our
prior ￿nding of a small or zero average e⁄ect of ownership on slant.
A second way to extend our ownership results is to ask whether slant responds
more to owner identity in circumstances in which the political returns to changing
consumers￿voting behavior are large. If ownership e⁄ects exist and are driven by a
desire to in￿ uence elections, this could provide a more powerful way to identify them.
To implement this test, we use our preliminary measure of slant in 2004, and test
whether slant is more responsive to owner identity (and less responsive to consumer
preferences) in states that were considered to be ￿battleground￿states during the
2004 presidential election. We ￿nd no evidence that this is the case, arguing against
the view that owners shift the slant of their newspapers to achieve political aims.49
A ￿nal way to look for an e⁄ect of ownership is to use direct evidence on the
political beliefs of owners themselves. Even if the overall impact of slant in our sample
is small, it could be the case that a subset of owners with strong political views have
a larger e⁄ect. As a rough proxy for the ideology of the individuals who control
newspaper ￿rms, we have computed the share of donations given by top newspaper
executives, and media ￿rms themselves, to Republican and Democratic campaigns.
In ￿gure 7, we plot the relationship between slant and the share of contributions
going to Republican candidates for three categories of contributions: (i) those from
executives at ￿rms that own multiple U.S. newspapers; (ii) those from executives
at independent newspapers (not jointly owned with any other U.S. paper); and (iii)
corporate contributions by newspaper ￿rms. The correlation between slant and con-
tributions is weak and insigni￿cant, both overall and taking each of these three groups
separately. This remains true in regressions controlling for the percent voting Repub-
lican in each paper￿ s market. The results are thus consistent with the view that the
identity of a newspaper￿ s owner is not an important determinant of slant.
49We also ￿nd no evidence of signi￿cant di⁄erences in owner e⁄ects between public and private
media ￿rms, or between papers in markets with high and low advertising rates. We have also
speci￿ed and estimated a model in which media ￿rms economize on ￿xed costs in the production
of news by minimizing the diversity of slant across their newspapers. This model predicts that a
newspaper￿ s slant will respond to variation in the political attitudes of markets served by co-owned
papers. We ￿nd no evidence for such an e⁄ect.
386 Additional Determinants of Newspaper Slant
In this section, we use our data to test for several other in￿ uences on newspaper slant
that have appeared in prominent economic models of media content.
6.1 Pressure from Incumbent Politicians
Besley and Prat (2006) present a model in which pressure or bribes from incumbent
politicians causes media ￿rms to produce more favorable coverage than they otherwise
would. Though this force is incontrovertibly important in some settings,50 it is not
as obvious whether pressure from incumbent politicians currently a⁄ects the slant of
coverage by U.S. newspapers.51
The evidence discussed in section 5.3 on the average level of slant is informative
about the extent to which political pressure shapes coverage at the national level.
During the period of our sample, both the White House and Congress were controlled
by Republicans. If national-level incumbents were using their power to substantially
change news coverage, we would expect to see the average newspaper in our sample
pulled to the right of the pro￿t-maximizing point. Although the average paper is
slightly to the right, the di⁄erence is small and statistically insigni￿cant, suggesting
that distortions caused through this channel are not large. Of course this does not
rule out the possibility that politicians exert greater in￿ uence on speci￿c issues or in
certain outlets.
A di⁄erent possibility is that local politicians in￿ uence slant. As a test of this
hypothesis, we have estimated a regression that allows slant to vary with the party
of the incumbent governor (as of the end of 2005), controlling for the preferences
of consumers. We ￿nd that, controlling for the preferences of consumers, having
a Republican governor is associated with a statistically insigni￿cant reduction (i.e.
leftward shift) in slant of about 0:9 percentage points, with a con￿dence interval
that rules out positive e⁄ects larger than about 0:5 percentage points (one-eighth of
50McMillan and Zoido (2004) present detailed evidence on the bribes paid by the chief of Peru￿ s
secret police to media ￿rms in exchange for supportive coverage. The U.S. government paid to place
favorable news articles in Iraqi newspapers (Mazzetti and Daragahi 2005). And direct censorship
by totalitarian regimes is of course a common occurrence.
51Although bribery and direct censorship are rare, it is frequently alleged that U.S. politicians
exert in￿ uence in more subtle ways, such as cutting o⁄ privileged access to government sources for
media outlets whose coverage is unfavorable (Ritea 2004).
39a standard deviation). We have also computed the share of representatives to the
U.S. House from districts in each newspaper￿ s market who are Republican, as of the
109th Congress. Controlling for consumers￿preferences, this share has a statistically
insigni￿cant negative e⁄ect on slant. Quantitatively, the coe¢ cient is extremely small,
indicating that moving from a completely Democratic to a completely Republican
delegation reduces newspaper slant by 0:004, with a con￿dence interval that can rule
out substantial positive e⁄ects.
Though crude, these tests provide the ￿rst direct, large-scale empirical evidence
on the impact of incumbent politicians on news content, and suggest that the party
a¢ liation of incumbents does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect U.S. newspapers￿political posi-
tioning.
6.2 Tastes of Reporters and Editors
A di⁄erent possibility is that the personal views of reporters and editors a⁄ect slant.
Baron (2006) develops a model in which workers are willing to accept lower wages to
publish news slanted toward their personal views, and shows that this could a⁄ect
slant in equilibrium.
As with in￿ uence by politicians, the evidence in section 5.3 is informative about
the importance of reporter or editor tastes at the national level. If the composition
of the national labor market is such that it is more expensive to hire reporters who
will write with a conservative slant, for example, we would expect to see the average
paper in our sample pulled to the left of the pro￿t-maximizing point. The fact that
this is not the case provides some evidence that employees￿tastes are not decisive in
the aggregate.
It could still be the case, however, that variation across markets is driven by the
tastes of local reporters and editors. This could cloud the interpretation of our earlier
estimates if these tastes vary in a similar way to the tastes of consumers, as it would
induce correlation between actual slant and market-level politics.
Although we cannot estimate the importance of workers￿tastes directly, we be-
lieve for three reasons that they are unlikely to be an important confound to our
￿ndings. First, in order for market-level variation of reporters￿and editors￿tastes
to matter, mobility across markets must be limited￿ for example, because there is
an economic advantage to newspapers of having reporters and editors drawn from
40the local population. Otherwise, newspapers would simply hire reporters and editors
willing to adhere to the slant best suited to consumer demand. Several pieces of
evidence suggest that newspapers are not con￿ned to hiring local talent, and that, if
anything, reporters and editors are more mobile than demographically similar profes-
sionals. According to one survey, the average college-educated journalist has nearly
a 40 percent chance of working in a Census division other than the one in which she
attended college (Weaver and Wilhoit 1996). This is considerably higher than the
average among other college-educated workers, according to evidence from the 1979
National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY).52 Census data support the view that
reporters are a highly mobile population, even compared with other highly educated
professionals. Controlling for education, age, gender, and race, reporters and editors
are 8 percentage points more likely to live in a state other than the one in which they
were born.53 Additionally, the labor market does not appear to assign any premium
to local talent in the market for reporters and editors. Reporters and editors born
outside their current state of residence earn, if anything, somewhat more than those
working in their states of nativity. Although this e⁄ect may be due in part to un-
measured variation in human capital (Wozniak 2006), combined with the evidence on
mobility patterns it provides little support for the view that newspaper owners ￿nd
it economically advantageous to hire locally.
Second, our model allows us to calibrate the magnitude of tastes for slant that
would be necessary to generate the variance in slant we observe in our data. Recall
that our demand estimates imply that choosing slant one standard deviation from
consumers￿preferred level of slant would reduce circulation (and, hence, variable
pro￿ts) by about 3 percent. If an average newspaper were to deviate by one standard
deviation from the optimal slant because of reporters￿tastes, it would have to be
the case that hiring equally quali￿ed reporters willing to produce at the optimal slant
would cost the ￿rm more than 3 percent of variable pro￿ts. To get a sense of the wage
e⁄ect this would imply, calculations based on data in Gentzkow (forthcoming) suggest
52We are extremely grateful to Lisa Kahn for providing the appropriate calculations from the
NLSY.
53They are also three percentage points more likely to have moved in the past ￿ve years. These
￿gures are coe¢ cients on reporter/editor dummies in regressions using data from the 1970, 1980,
1990, and 2000 Censuses (Ruggles et al, 2004). The sample is restricted to 25- to 55-year-old workers
in professional occupations (1950 occupation codes 000-099). Wage regressions reported below are
restricted to prime-age male reporters and editors working full-time.
41that the Washington Post￿ s variable pro￿t in 2004 was on the order of $500 million.54
Burrelle￿ s/Luce Media Directory 2001 (Burrelle￿ s Information Services 2001) lists
222 reporters and 175 editors working for the Post. If we assume that the average
reporter￿ s salary is $90,000 per year and the average editor￿ s salary is $125,000 per
year (probably overestimates), we estimate the Post￿ s wage bill for reporters and
editors to be about $42 million per year. This implies that the paper would have to
be unable to hire sta⁄ willing to produce at the optimal slant even if it were willing
to increase wages by (500/42)*3.5 percent = 36 percent. Although these estimates
are rough, and the Washington Post is not necessarily a representative paper, they
suggest that both the magnitude of tastes for slant and the barriers to mobility would
have to be extremely large to explain a signi￿cant fraction of the variation of slant in
our sample.
Finally, we have computed an alternate version of our slant measure using only
stories written by newspapers￿Washington D.C. bureaus. Because the reporters and
editors in these bureaus live and work in Washington D.C., barriers to mobility would
not induce a correlation between these reporters￿views and those of a paper￿ s local
market. Although many papers do not have Washington bureaus, and our power
is correspondingly lower, a regression of the slant of these stories on the percent
Republican in the newspaper￿ s market yields a positive and statistically signi￿cant
coe¢ cient, with a value not statistically distinguishable from the coe¢ cient we obtain
when we use the overall slant measure.
6.3 Newspaper Competition
Mullainathan and Shleifer￿ s (2005) model predicts that, because product di⁄eren-
tiation softens price competition, newspapers in competitive markets will be more
￿biased￿than monopoly papers, in the sense that competitive papers￿slants will de-
viate from one another and from the preferences of the median consumer. Our data
contain only very limited information about the role of competition, as our sample
includes only 29 newspapers in cities with two or more independently owned, com-
peting newspapers. However, as a crude test of Mullainathan and Shleifer￿ s (2005)
54Gentzkow (forthcoming) estimates that the variable pro￿t per daily copy sold is $1.83. Applying
the same pro￿t rate to Sunday copies (probably an understatement) gives a total yearly variable
pro￿t of $539 million.
42hypothesis we can ask whether newspapers in multi-paper cities display a greater
deviation from the preferences of the average consumer than do newspapers in one-
paper cities. To implement this test, we regress slant on the Republican share of
the two-party vote in 2004 among newspapers in single-paper cities, and compute the
predicted value as a measure of the average consumer￿ s preferred slant. We then com-
pute the di⁄erence between predicted slant and the observed slant of each paper. We
￿nd that the average squared di⁄erence is higher in multi-paper cities than in single-
paper cities, though the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant. Thus, our evidence
is directionally consistent with the hypothesis that competition between newspapers
creates greater heterogeneity in slant. It is important to stress that, with so few
observations in multi-paper cities, the power of this test is limited.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we develop and estimate a new measure of slant that compares the
use of partisan language in newspapers with that of Democrats and Republicans in
Congress. Our measure is computable with a minimum of subjective input, is related
to readers￿subjective ratings of newspaper slant, and is available for newspapers
representing over 70 percent of the daily circulation in the United States.
Combining our measure with zipcode-level circulation data, we show that con-
sumer demand responds strongly to the ￿t between a newspaper￿ s slant and the
ideology of potential readers, implying an economic incentive for newspapers to tailor
their slant to the ideological predispositions of consumers. We document such an
e⁄ect, and show that variation in consumer preferences accounts for roughly one-￿fth
of the variation in measured slant in our sample.
By contrast, we ￿nd much less evidence for a role of newspaper owners in deter-
mining slant. While slant is somewhat correlated across co-owned papers, this e⁄ect
seems largely to be driven by the geographic clustering of ownership groups. After
controlling for the geographic location of newspapers, we ￿nd no evidence that the
variation in slant has an owner-speci￿c component. We also ￿nd no evidence that
pressure from incumbent politicians or the tastes of reporters are important drivers
of slant.
Taken together, our ￿ndings suggest that ownership diversity may not be a critical
43precondition for ideological diversity in the media, at least along the dimension we
consider. This conclusion has broad implications for the regulation of ownership in
the media. We note, however, that our results may well be di⁄erent in settings with
signi￿cantly di⁄erent legal or institutional environments￿ less developed markets,
more state ownership, less freedom of the press￿ and that determining how these
factors a⁄ect the determination of slant remains an open question.
44A Appendix: Details on News Searches
A.1 Mechanics of Searches
Following the steps outlined in 3.1, we identify 1,000 phrases to use in our analysis.
We wish to count the number of times each of these 1,000 phrases appears in each of
our 433 newspapers, using the ProQuest and NewsLibrary databases. As discussed
in the text, we use counts from the NewsLibrary database when available and counts
from the ProQuest database otherwise.
Recall that we apply two pre-processing steps to the Congressional Record as
described in section 2. First, we drop extremely common words such as ￿to,￿￿from,￿
and ￿the,￿using a standard list of these ￿stopwords￿from Fox (1990). Second, we run
the text through an algorithm called the ￿Porter Stemmer￿that strips words down
to shared linguistic roots. This means that phrases in the Congressional Record that
di⁄er only in either stopwords or su¢ xes are equivalent in our algorithm. For example,
￿war on terror,￿￿war against terror,￿and ￿wars on terror￿would all appear in the
pre-processed Congressional Record as ￿war terror￿and thus be treated as the same
phrase. Each of our 1,000 phrases thus corresponds to a group of one, two, or several
￿original phrases￿ , and it is these original phrases that we search for in the databases.
There are two reasons why the set of original phrases we search is slightly reduced.
First, the ProQuest database limits search strings to 75 characters. We therefore drop
any original phrase longer than 75 characters. Second, our database of Congressional
Record text has improved over time as we have adjusted for errors in the source
website and improved our parsing algorithm. The set of original phrases included in
each group is based on a slightly older version of the Congressional Record text than
the one used for our main analysis, and so omits some relatively rare original phrases.
We search for each group of original phrases (connected with the ￿OR￿operator) in
the ￿All Text￿￿eld (NewsLibrary) or ￿Document Text￿￿eld (ProQuest), restricted to
2005 and with the following terms excluded from the ￿Headline￿and ￿Author￿￿elds:
￿editor,￿￿editorial,￿￿associated press,￿￿ap,￿￿opinion,￿￿op-ed,￿and ￿letter.￿
A.2 Audit Study
Our searches are designed to isolate the slant of news content produced independently
by each paper. The way stories are archived and classi￿ed in the databases means
that we can only imperfectly separate these stories from other kinds of content such
as opinion pieces and wire stories. To provide a more precise picture of the kinds of
content we are measuring, we have audited the results for seven phrases chosen from
table 1. For each phrase, we looked at the full set of hits for the papers included in the
NewsLibrary database and recorded whether they appeared to be: (i) independently
produced news stories; (ii) AP wire stories; (iii) other wire stories; (iv) letters to the
editor; (v) opinion pieces (including unsigned editorials). Because we do not have
access to the full text of articles in NewsLibrary, this classi￿cation is based on the
headline and ￿rst paragraph of the story.
In a separate exercise, we use results from the papers we can search in the ProQuest
45database (for which we can retrieve full text articles) to record the number of times
each phrase appears in quotation.
The results are shown in appendix table 1. Overall, approximately 71 percent of
our hits are independently-produced news stories. Of the remainder, 23 percent are
either clearly or possibly opinion, 3 percent are letters to the editor, and 3 percent are
wire stories. The table also shows that these shares are heterogeneous across phrases.
For example, the share of opinion pieces ranges from 11 percent for ￿global war on
terrorism￿to 50 percent for ￿death tax.￿The results also show that only 10 percent
of our hits appear in quotations, with the share ranging from 3 percent for ￿child
support enforcement￿to 36 percent for ￿death tax.￿We have also spot checked the
articles that are being excluded from our search results and veri￿ed that virtually all
of them are, as desired, either wire stories or opinion pieces.
Taken together, the results con￿rm that our measure is primarily picking up the
slant of independently-produced news stories, with some weight given to opinion
pieces.
B Appendix: Additional Robustness Checks
In this section, we discuss a number of checks on our main results; namely, that
consumer preferences drive an important part of the variation in newspaper slant,
and that ownership explains a much smaller share of this variation. We present
the results of these alternative speci￿cations in appendix table 2. In each row, we
present the results of a random e⁄ects model of the form used in table 4, in which we
regress a newspaper￿ s slant on percent voting for Bush in 2004 in its market, state
￿xed e⁄ects, and owner-speci￿c random e⁄ects. The table presents the estimated
e⁄ect of consumer preferences, and estimates of the share of the residual (within-
state) variance attributable to variance in consumer preferences and ownership. For
comparison, row (1) presents results from the ￿nal speci￿cation in table 4, along with
the expected coe¢ cient on percent Republican (~ ￿) from our preferred demand model.
In row (2) of appendix table 2, we relax the assumption that newspapers￿per-
reader markup is constant across zipcodes, and allow for a more realistic pro￿t func-
tion in which readers￿value to advertisers di⁄ers according to their demographics.
To estimate the advertising value of each zipcode, we use cross-newspaper variation
in ad rates to estimate the approximate advertising value of di⁄erent demographics.
We then apply the coe¢ cients from this regression to each zipcode￿ s demographic
characteristics, to produce an estimate of the advertising value of readers in each zip-
code. Finally, we combine these estimates with data on cover prices and estimates of
marginal costs (following Gentzkow forthcoming) to generate a per-reader markup for
each zipcode. As the table shows, computing the pro￿t-maximizing slant using this
richer model does not meaningfully a⁄ect the relationship between slant and market
percent Republican implied by our demand model.
In row (3) of appendix table 2, we relax a second assumption of our demand
framework, namely that all households in a given zipcode have identical preferences
for slant. As an alternative, we assume that each household i in zipcode z has an
46ideology qiz and an ideal slant of
~ yiz = ￿ + ￿qiz (17)
We then assume that qiz = ￿z + ￿iz, where ￿iz is a standard normal random variable
with cdf ￿, and ￿z is a shift parameter governing the mean ideology in a zipcode.
Maintaining the demand model￿ s other assumptions, it is straightforward to show
that, in this case, our equation (9) becomes (with slight abuse of notation):






+ Xz￿1 + Wzn￿2 + "zn. (18)
If we further suppose that a household votes for Bush in 2004 if and only if ￿z ￿ 0
(where 0 could be replaced by any arbitrary constant), then ￿z = ￿￿1 (rz). It is then
straightforward to estimate model (18), by estimating ￿z using empirically observed
donation shares, and adjusting for measurement error using the delta method. As
the table shows, this alternative demand framework makes similar (but less precise)
predictions about the empirical relationship between slant and consumer preferences,
relative to our baseline model.
In row (4) of appendix table 2, we conduct a related robustness check, in which we
exclude newspapers headquartered in multi-paper cities from our analysis. Excluding
these papers provides an additional check on whether the fact that we have not
modeled competition directly is a source of bias in our estimates. As the table shows,
this exclusion does not meaningfully change our results.
In row (5) of appendix table 2, we show that our results are robust to controlling
for a measure of the ￿sophistication￿of the newspaper￿ s language. Variation in so-
phistication could confound our estimates if, for example, more liberal markets tend
also to be more educated, and hence prefer more sophisticated language. To mea-
sure the sophistication of a newspaper￿ s language, we have estimated a version of our
￿slant￿measure in which we replace congressperson ideology with a measure of the
share of adults with a college degree or higher in the congressperson￿ s constituency. In
other words, the sophistication measure tells us how educated we would expect a con-
gressperson￿ s constituency to be given data on her use of our 1,000 partisan phrases.
Applied to newspapers, the measure allows us to assess how educated a newspaper￿ s
constituency would be, if it were in Congress. As row (4) shows, controlling for this
variable does not meaningfully a⁄ect our results.
In row (6) of appendix table 2, we consider the robustness of our results to an
alteration in our selection of partisan phrases. In particular, we tighten the cuto⁄s
on the number of hits a phrase must have in newspaper headlines from 2000-2005 by
setting them equal to the 5th and 95th percentiles in our sample. We then select from
the remaining phrases the top 1,000 by ￿2. Computing our slant measure based on
this list results in essentially identical statistical results. This ￿nding suggests that
the minimum and maximum hit cuto⁄s we have imposed for computational e¢ ciency
are not a likely source of bias.
In row (7) of appendix table 2, we show results using an alternative measure of
slant, generated by measuring a congressperson￿ s ideology using her adjusted ADA
47score (Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999), rather than the presidential votes of her
constituency. The adjusted ADA score measures the left-right orientation of a con-
gressperson￿ s roll call votes, and has di⁄erent units (and a di⁄erent sign) from the per-
cent Republican in the congressperson￿ s constituency. Other than the inconsequential
change in units, the ADA-based measure does not yield di⁄erent conclusions.
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53Table 1 Politically loaded phrases from the 2005 Congressional Record
Panel A: Phrases used more often by Democrats
Two-word phrases
private accounts rosa parks workers rights
trade agreement president budget poor people
american people republican party republican leader
tax breaks change the rules arctic refuge
trade de￿cit minimum wage cut funding
oil companies budget de￿cit american workers
credit card republican senators living in poverty
nuclear option privatization plan senate republicans
war in iraq wildlife refuge fuel e¢ ciency
middle class card companies national wildlife
african american security trust president cheney
budget cuts bill cuts price gouging
nuclear weapons medicaid cuts iraq war
checks and balances trade policy million americans
civil rights asian paci￿c house republicans
veterans health cia agent assault weapons
cut medicaid billions of dollars senior citizens
foreign oil abuse of power cost of the war
president plan manufacturing jobs karl rove
gun violence billion in tax spending cuts
black caucus lost their jobs record pro￿ts
national debt central american bunker buster
public broadcasting child labor food stamps
child support low income bring our troops
student loans cut programs troops home
Three-word phrases
veterans health care corporation for public broadcasting cut health care
congressional black caucus additional tax cuts civil rights movement
va health care pay for tax cuts cuts to child support
billion in tax cuts tax cuts for people drilling in the arctic national
credit card companies oil and gas companies victims of gun violence
security trust fund prescription drug bill solvency of social security
social security trust caliber sniper ri￿es voting rights act
privatize social security increase in the minimum wage war in iraq and afghanistan
american free trade system of checks and balances civil rights protections
central american free middle class families credit card debt
national wildlife refuge cut student loans little rock nine
dependence on foreign oil american people deserve social security plan
tax cuts for the wealthy cut food stamps arctic wildlife refuge
vice president cheney health care education education health care
arctic national wildlife federal trade commission social security the president
bring our troops home congressional hispanic caucus social security bene￿ts
social security privatization alternative minimum tax explosive device detonated
billion trade de￿cit asian and paci￿c islander plan to privatize social
asian paci￿c american global gag rule ryan white care
president bush took o¢ ce cut social security major oil companies
privatization of social security billion in tax breaks outing a cia agent
privatizing social security below the poverty line fuel economy standards
party line vote middle class americans improvised explosive device
child support enforcement funding for veterans health president social security
credit card industry health care for veterans international labor organization
54Panel B: Phrases used more often by Republicans
Two-word phrases
stem cell personal accounts retirement accounts
natural gas saddam hussein government spending
death tax pass the bill national forest
illegal aliens private property minority leader
class action border security urge support
war on terror president announces cell lines
embryonic stem human life cord blood
tax relief chief justice action lawsuits
illegal immigration human embryos economic growth
date the time increase taxes food program
boy scouts growth rate time and i move
hate crimes cell research legal system
oil for food property rights nuclear power
global war border patrol democrat leader
medical liability budget committee growing economy
highway bill consent decrees raising taxes
adult stem crimes law witnesses may testify
democratic leader post o¢ ce savings accounts
federal spending european union iraqi people
tax increase president business forest service
raise taxes postal service law we can change
illegal immigrants terri schiavo immigration reform
president i move circuit court indian a⁄airs
third time temporary worker ten commandments
percent growth war on terrorism un reform
Three-word phrases
embryonic stem cell circuit court of appeals tongass national forest
hate crimes legislation death tax repeal pluripotent stem cells
adult stem cells housing and urban a⁄airs supreme court of texas
oil for food program million jobs created justice priscilla owen
personal retirement accounts national ￿ood insurance justice janice rogers
energy and natural resources oil for food scandal american bar association
global war on terror private property rights growth and job creation
hate crimes law temporary worker program natural gas natural
change hearts and minds class action reform grand ole opry
global war on terrorism chief justice rehnquist reform social security
class action fairness percent growth rate judge john roberts
committee on foreign relations united states postal service gas natural gas
de￿cit reduction bill american farm bureau supply of natural gas
boy scouts of america gross national product chief of naval operations
repeal of the death tax social security reform underground storage tank
highway trust fund export import bank partial birth abortion
action fairness act justice of the supreme court judicial con￿rmation process
committee on commerce science price of natural gas personal savings accounts
cord blood stem ￿fth circuit court near earth objects
medical liability reform social security system national security issue
stem cell lines committee on homeland security law enforcement and intelligence
blood stem cells united nations reform justice william rehnquist
supreme court of the united million illegal aliens medical liability crisis
health savings accounts california supreme court judge alberto gonzales
banking housing and urban term care insurance economic growth and job
Notes: Table shows top 150 Democratic and Republican phrases respectively, ranked by ￿2. See section 3 for details.
55Table 2 Estimates of the demand for slant
Dependent variable: Share of households in zipcode subscribing to newspaper
Description (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model OLS 2SLS 2SLS/RC 2SLS/RC 2SLS/RC
(Zip share donating 0.1800 0.6115 1.0790 0.7781 0.8323
to Republicans) ￿ Slant (0.0705) (0.1868) (0.3120) (0.2925) (0.3011)
Zip share donating -0.0176 -0.2158 -0.4234 -0.3082 -0.3310
to Republicans (0.0352) (0.0873) (0.1432) (0.1374) (0.1409)
(Zip share donating -0.0615 -0.0625 -0.0659 -0.0395 -0.0417
to Republicans)2 (0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0127) (0.0122) (0.0119)
Market-newspaper FE? X X X X X
Zipcode demographics? X X
Zipcode X market char.? X
Estimate of ￿ 0.0976 0.3529 0.3924 0.3961 0.3976
(Con￿dence interval) (-0.94;0.29) (0.19;0.40) (0.30;0.42) (0.21;0.44) (0.24;0.44)
Estimate of ￿ 0.6838 0.2044 0.1222 0.1016 0.1003
(Con￿dence interval) (0.34;2.64) (0.12;0.52) (0.06;0.30) (0.03;0.41) (0.03;0.37)
Estimate of ￿ 0.1316 1.4958 4.4165 3.8285 4.1501
(Con￿dence interval) (0.01;0.44) (0.23;4.06) (0.82;12.2) (0.23;18.1) (0.32;17.4)
Number of observations 62177 62177 62177 62177 62177
Number of newspapers 297 297 297 297 297
Source: Authors￿ calculations based on Audit Bureau of Circulations (newspaper sub-
scriptions), Federal Election Commission (campaign contributions), U.S. Presidential Atlas
(county-level voting), U.S. Census (zipcode demographics), Editor and Publisher Interna-
tional Yearbook 2000-2005 (newspaper location).
Notes: Table shows estimates of models of the form of equation (9). Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered by newspaper. Zipcode demographics are: log of total popula-
tion, log of income per capita, percent of population urban, percent white, percent black,
population per square mile, share of houses owner-occupied, and the share of population
25 and over whose highest level of schooling is college, all as of 2000. ￿Zipcode X market
characteristics￿refers to a vector of these characteristics interacted with their analogue at








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































57Table 4 Decomposing the variation in newspaper slant
Coe¢ cient on percent Republican predicted by demand model (~ ￿) 0.1033
(Con￿dence interval) (0.03;0.37)
Dependent variable: Slant index (^ yn)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent Republican ￿ 0.1466 0.1594 0.1717
in newspaper￿ s market (0.0152) (0.0159) (0.0155)
Census division ￿xed e⁄ects? X
State ￿xed e⁄ects? X
Standard deviation of 0.0145 0.0125 0.0087 0.0000
ownership e⁄ect (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0051)
Ownership share of 0.1312 0.0987 0.0571 0.0000
residual variation (0.0688) (0.0541) (0.0413) (0.0603)
Consumer share of 0.1875 0.1923 0.2225
residual variation (0.0389) (0.0382) (0.0402)
Number of observations 429 429 429 429
Number of multi-paper groups 36 36 36 36
Source: Authors￿calculations based on U.S. Presidential Atlas (county-level voting), Editor
and Publisher International Yearbook 2000-2005 (newspaper location and ownership).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See section 3 for derivation of slant index. Newspa-
per market is de￿ned as the newspaper￿ s primary metropolitan statistical area if available,
and the newspaper￿ s county if not. Models estimated via maximum likelihood. Standard
errors on the standard deviation of the ownership e⁄ect and the ownership share of the
variation are obtained through a parametric bootstrap. Ownership and consumer share of
residual variation are the share of variation in slant explained by ownership group random
e⁄ects and percent Republican respectively; in columns (2), (4) and (5) the share(s) are
computed after partialling for group, division, and state ￿xed e⁄ects respectively.
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1 2 3 4 5
Mondo Times conservativeness rating
Source: Authors￿calculations based on Mondo Times at <http://www.mondotimes.com>
(bias ratings).
Notes: Figure shows slant index (y-axis) against average Mondo Times user rating of news-
paper conservativeness (x-axis), which ranges from 1 (liberal) to 5 (conservative). See
section 3 for derivation of slant index. Figure includes all papers rated by at least two users
on Mondo Times, with at least 25,000 mentions of our 1,000 phrases in 2005.
59Figure 2 Newspaper slant and consumer demand
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.4 .45 .5 .55
Slant measure
Source: Authors￿calculations based on Audit Bureau of Circulations (newspaper subscrip-
tions), Federal Election Commission (campaign contributions)
Notes: Y-axis shows the estimated coe¢ cient in a regression of the share of households
in the zipcode reading each newspaper on the zipcode share Republican, for newspapers
circulating in at least 300 zipcodes. X-axis shows slant measure.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Zipcode decile of Republican contribution share
Slant Quartile 4
Source: Authors￿calculations based on Audit Bureau of Circulations (newspaper subscrip-
tions), Federal Election Commission (campaign contributions).
Notes: Figure shows coe¢ cients on decile dummies in regressions of the share of households
in a zipcode reading a newspaper on dummies for decile of share donating to Republicans
in the 2000-2004 election cycle, with market-newspaper ￿xed e⁄ects, and weighted by zip-
code population. Equation is estimated separately for newspapers in each quartile of the
distribution of measured slant.
















-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15
Slant - Ideal point
Source: Authors￿calculations based on U.S. Presidential Atlas, FEC contribution data, and
Audit Bureau of Circulations (ideal points).
Notes: Figure shows the distribution of the di⁄erence between newspapers￿actual slant
and our estimate of their pro￿t-maximizing level of slant (^ yn￿idealn). See section 3 for
derivation of slant index, and section 4.4 for details on the computation of pro￿t-maximizing
level of slant. The dashed line indicates the mean of the distribution and the dotted lines
indicate the 95 percent con￿dence interval for the value of the mean (incorporating both
sampling variation in slant and uncertainty in the demand estimates that are inputs to
computing idealn).





















.2 .4 .6 .8
Market percent Republican
Actual slant Profit-maximizing slant
Source: Authors￿calculations based on U.S. Presidential Atlas (county-level voting), Editor
and Publisher International Yearbook 2000-2005 (newspaper location).
Notes: Figure shows newspaper slant index and pro￿t-maximizing level of slant (y-axis)
against Bush￿ s share of the two-party vote in 2004 in the newspaper￿ s market (x-axis). See
section 3 for derivation of slant index, and section 4.4 for details on the computation of pro￿t-
maximizing slant. Newspaper market is de￿ned as the newspaper￿ s primary metropolitan
statistical area if available, and the newspaper￿ s county if not.
63Figure 6 Newspaper slant and ownership
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Slant index





































































-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
Slant index - residual
Source: Authors￿calculations based on Editor and Publisher International Yearbook 2000-
2005 (newspaper location and ownership).
Notes: See section 3 for derivation of slant index. Figure A shows average slant of co-owned
newspapers graphed against a newspaper￿ s own slant. Figure B parallels ￿gure A, but
measures slant using residuals from a regression of slant on percent Republican in market
and dummies for the state in which the newspaper is located.
























































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Share of contributions to Republicans
Newspaper Group Executives
Independent Newspaper Executives
Newspaper Group Corporate Contributions
Source: Authors￿calculations based on Editor and Publisher International Yearbook 2000-
2005 (newspaper ownership), Federal Election Commission (donations of executives), Center
for Public Integrity (corporate donations).
Notes: Figure shows average slant of newspapers owned by a ￿rm graphed against the share














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































66Appendix Table 2 Additional robustness checks






(1) Baseline 0.1033 0.1717 0.0000 0.2225
(0.03;0.37) (0.0155) (0.0603) (0.0402)
(2) Weighting zipcodes 0.1044 ￿ ￿ ￿
by predicted pro￿ts (0.04;0.38)
(3) Allowing within-zipcode 0.1788 ￿ ￿ ￿
heterogeneity in ideology (-0.85;1.64)
(4) Exclude multi-paper cities 0.1033 0.1556 0.0000 0.1901
from supply model (0.03;0.37) (0.0162) (0.0556) (0.0396)
(5) Controlling for predicted 0.1033 0.1741 0.0000 0.2249
sophistication (0.03;0.37) (0.0156) (0.0601) (0.0403)
(6) Tightening cuto⁄s on 0.0985 0.1680 0.0000 0.1928
phrase counts by 5% (0.04;0.36) (0.0166) (0.0557) (0.0381)
(7) Measuring ideology -21.37 -31.31 0.0000 0.2001
with adjusted ADA score (-78.6;-6.92) (3.022) (0.0627) (0.0386)
Source: Authors￿calculations based on U.S. Presidential Atlas (county-level voting), Editor
and Publisher International Yearbook 2000-2005 (newspaper location and ownership).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See section 3 for derivation of slant index, and sec-
tion 4.4 for details on the computation of expected coe¢ cient on percent Republican (~ ￿).
Newspaper market is de￿ned as the newspaper￿ s primary metropolitan statistical area if
available, and the newspaper￿ s county if not. Models include state ￿xed e⁄ects and owner
random e⁄ects, and are estimated via maximum likelihood. Standard errors on the owner-
ship share of the variation are obtained through a parametric bootstrap. Ownership and
consumer share of residual variation are the share of variation in slant explained by owner-
ship group random e⁄ects and percent Republican respectively; these shares are computed
after partialling for state ￿xed e⁄ects. See appendix B for details.
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